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	 												Abstract			In	financial	markets,	banks	play	a	key	role	in	transforming	illiquid	assets	into	more	liquid	assets.	However,	their	ability	to	spread	the	risk	of	liquidity	shocks	over	a	body	of	agents	generates	a	positive	probability	for	non-efficient	bank	runs.	Building	off	of	the	classic	Diamond-Dybvig	framework,	this	paper	uses	an	agent	based	model	to	observe	the	two	equilibria,	efficient	risk	sharing	and	the	bank	run.	While	previous	literature	has	looked	at	under	what	conditions	could	a	bank	run	equilibrium	occur,	this	proximity	based	learning	model	(PBLM)	focuses	on	the	development	of	a	panic	driven	bank	run	in	light	of	limited	information,	proximity	based	learning,	and	localized	interactions	among	heterogeneous	agents.	This	simulation	approach	is	novel	in	that	it	allows	for	the	inclusion	of	more	realistic	conditions	(e.g.	heterogeneity	and	learning)	that	would	make	such	a	model	difficult	to	solve,	if	not	mathematically	intractable.	This	paper	finds	proximity	based	learning	to	be	an	effective	method	of	communication	and	a	panic	transmission	mechanism	when	consumers	only	have	limited	information.		 	
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Economic	intuition	is	like	peeing.	It	starts	with	a	trickle,	but	when	it	flows	it	flows.							To	view	the	final	presentation	of	this	thesis,	please	visit:	https://drive.google.com/open?id=0B0MoyidSAJ1zdE1XdXZ1dnhrUzg		To	view	the	source	code	for	this	project,	please	visit:	https://github.com/syee/Lending-Market-ABM/tree/master		 	
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Introduction		 Banks	are	able	to	transform	underlying	illiquid	assets	into	liquid	assets	that	are	preferable	to	risk	averse	consumers.	However,	this	liquidity	service	comes	at	the	cost	of	creating	a	positive	probability	of	a	bank	run.	Diamond	and	Dybvig	(1983)	explored	this	concept	using	a	framework	that	would	become	the	standard	in	bank	run	literature.	The	Proximity	Based	Learning	Model	(hereafter	referred	to	as	the	PBLM)	expands	on	Diamond	and	Dybvig’s	model	(hereafter	referred	to	as	the	DD	model)	by	using	proximity	based	learning	as	an	explicit	panic	transmission	mechanism.	This	is	a	clear	diverging	from	the	DD	model	which	assumes	all	consumers	have	access	to	the	same	information	so	they	can	simultaneously	panic	and	essentially	coordinate	a	bank	run.	Through	the	use	of	proximity	based	learning,	the	PBLM	is	able	to	uniquely	observe	how	panic	can	start	at	the	individual	level	and	organically	develop	into	a	system	wide	phenomenon.		 Since	the	DD	model	is	discussed	throughout	this	paper	both	directly	and	in	comparison	to	the	PBLM,	I	will	now	give	only	brief	overview	of	the	DD	model.	In	the	DD	model,	consumers	are	each	endowed	with	an	illiquid	asset	that	offers	a	low	return	after	one	period	or	a	high	return	after	two	periods.	Type	1	consumers	will	wish	to	consume	their	asset	after	one	period	and	type	2	consumers	prefer	to	consume	after	two	periods.	Starting	in	period	0,	consumers	do	not	know	their	type.	Thus	they	each	face	“a	privately	observed,	uninsurable	risk	of	being	of	type	1	or	of	type	2.”1	A	bank	is	able	to	pool	these	assets	and	offer	a	liquid	asset	that	offers	a	higher	return	after	one	period	and	a	lower	return	after	two	periods.	Assuming																																																									1	DD	(1983)	p.405.	
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consumers	are	sufficiently	risk	averse,	banks	can	create	an	optimal	risk	sharing	that	provides	greater	utility	to	both	type	1	and	type	2	consumers.	However,	if	a	larger	than	expected	proportion	of	consumers	are	identified	as	being	of	type	1,	the	system	is	at	risk	for	a	bank	failure	where	all	consumers	attempt	to	liquidate	their	asset	after	one	period	regardless	of	their	type.		 Each	consumer	has	one	opportunity	to	withdraw	assets	from	the	bank	after	one	period	and	they	do	so	under	the	sequential	service	constraint.	They	essentially	line	up	and	are	served	in	a	random	order	one	at	a	time	until	the	bank	has	no	more	assets.	Any	remaining	assets	are	distributed	equally	among	any	consumers	that	elected	not	to	withdraw	in	the	next	period.	In	the	DD	model,	each	consumer	is	aware	of	the	intended	withdrawals	of	all	other	consumers.	If	enough	consumers	intend	to	withdraw	their	assets	after	one	period	that	the	bank	will	not	be	adequately	endowed	for	the	next	period,	all	consumers	are	aware	of	the	impending	liquidity	shortage.	In	this	case,	all	consumers	will	attempt	to	withdraw	assets	from	the	bank	regardless	of	their	type	(i.e.	type	2	consumers	would	also	attempt	to	withdraw).	This	is	considered	the	bank	run	equilibrium	that	“provides	allocations	that	are	worse	for	all	agents	than	they	would	have	obtained	without	the	bank.”2		 The	idea	that	consumers	all	share	the	same	complete	knowledge	is	criticized	in	several	other	papers	as	not	being	realistic.	Goldstein	and	Pauzner	(2005)	build	off	of	the	DD	model	but	instead	have	investors	“observe	noisy	signals”	regarding	the	fundamentals	of	the	economy.3	All	noisy	signals	are	based	off	of	fundamentals,	but	there	is	no	communication	between	investors	regarding	the	different	signals.																																																									2	DD	(1983)	p.409.	3	Goldstein	and	Pauzner	(2005)	p.1294.	
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Goldstein	and	Pauzner	find	that	the	noisy	signals	can	give	investors	incorrect	expectations	regarding	the	state	of	the	system	and	actually	lead	to	bank	runs		“even	when	the	economic	environment	is	sufficiently	strong	that	depositors	would	not	have	run	had	they	thought	other	depositors	would	not	run.”4		This	idea	of	a	panic	or	run	occurring	even	though	fundamentals	were	strong	will	be	referred	to	in	the	PBLM	as	unnecessary.	Goldstein	and	Pauzner	determine	the	“probability	of	panic-based	runs	and	relate	it	to	the	[banking]	contract.”5	They	find	that	the	more	risk	sharing	created	by	the	banking	contract,	the	greater	the	probability	of	a	bank	run.		 Chari	and	Jagannathan	(1988)	use	an	idea	where	if	a	group	of	consumers	withdrawing	was	unusually	large,	“uninformed	individuals	will	be	misled	and	will	precipitate	a	run	on	the	bank.”6	This	is	consistent	with	the	popularized	idea	of	the	Great	Depression	where	observing	long	lines	outside	of	banks	made	consumers	nervous	about	the	possibility	of	bank	failures	and	thus	inspired	them	to	join	the	line	and	also	withdraw	their	money.	Not	only	would	this	increase	liquidity	strains	on	banks,	the	line	would	get	longer	encouraging	even	more	individuals	to	panic.	Chari	and	Jagannathan	found	the	above	idea	could	lead	to	bank	runs	“even	if	no	one	has	any	adverse	information	about	future	returns.”7	In	their	study,	these	unnecessary	panics	impose	social	costs	as	well	as	liquidation	costs.	
																																																								4	Goldstein	and	Pauzner	(2005)	p.	1295.	5	Ibid	6	Chari	and	Jagannathan	(1988)	p.	749.	7	Chari	and	Jagannathan	(1988)	p.	759.	
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A	key	differentiator	between	the	PBLM	and	the	other	studies	that	have	been	mentioned	is	the	focus	the	PBLM	places	on	the	panic	transmission	process.8	The	PBLM	uses	learning	where	consumers	have	the	opportunity	to	gather	information	from	their	peers.	A	consumer	then	uses	that	information	to	form	beliefs	about	the	state	of	the	system.	Consumers	use	these	“ad-hoc	expectations”	that	are	not	entirely	rational	to	then	make	decisions	regarding	panics.	For	example,	Consumer	A	might	look	at	his	neighbors	and	see	they	are	all	withdrawing	large	sums	from	the	bank.	Consumer	A	would	use	that	information	to	infer	that	overall	liquidity	demands	on	the	bank	are	so	high	that	Consumer	A	panics	and	withdraws	his	money	too	because	he	thinks	the	bank	might	fail.	Consumer	A’s	decision	to	panic	will	affect	any	other	consumer	that	observes	him.	Thus	readers	can	see	how	the	learning	process	allows	information	to	spread	in	a	social	network	like	manner.	Kelly	and	O	Grada	(2000)	conducted	an	empirical	study	based	on	this		“Idea	of	market	panics	spreading	through	social	contagion—where	individuals	hear	some	bad	news	and	communicate	it	to	their	acquaintances,	who	pass	it	on	in	turn,	leading	to	a	market	panic.”9		They	looked	at	two	bank	runs	that	occurred	in	a	New	York	bank	in	the	1850s.	Using	old	marriage	records	and	large	amounts	of	background	information	on	depositors,	Kelly	and	O	Grada	were	able	to	reconstruct	the	social	networks	of	account	holders	of	the	bank.	They	found	“the	most	important	factor	in	whether	they	[depositors]	panicked…was	county	of	origin.”10	This	was	indicative	of	the	social	network	structure	of	many	of	the	Irish	immigrant	depositors.	Using	a	social	network	as	a																																																									8	See	Proximity	Based	Learning	Section	for	details.	9	Kelly	and	O	Grada	(2000)	p.	1110.	10	Kelly	and	O	Grada	(2000)	p.	1123.	
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source	of	information	and	communication	like	the	PBLM	does	through	learning	is	supported	by	the	empirical	results	found	by	Kelly	and	O	Grada.		 The	reason	this	project	is	significant	is	that	bank	runs	are	bad.	Bernanke	(1983)	and	Friedman	and	Schwartz	(1963)	found	that	bank	runs	imposed	huge	costs	on	the	U.S.	economy	in	the	1930s.	Diamond	and	Dybvig	also	argue		“runs	are	costly	and	reduce	social	welfare	by	interrupting	production	(when	loans	are	called)	and	by	destroying	optimal	risk	sharing	among	depositors.”11		While	bank	runs	can	be	inevitable	if	initial	withdrawals	are	large	enough,	bank	runs	can	also	develop	if	consumers	unnecessarily	panic	due	to	what	Goldstein	and	Pauzner	call	bad	expectations.	All	of	the	studies	mentioned	thus	far	indicate	panic	create	panic.	Thus	enough	unnecessary	panics	can	actually	increase	liquidity	demands	on	a	system	to	the	point	where	it	will	fail	when	it	should	not	have	had	consumers	not	been	fearing	a	panic.	The	PBLM	uses	learning	so	that	the	panic	transmission	process	can	actually	be	modeled	in	a	way	where	factors	that	affect	the	probability	of	unnecessary	panics	can	be	identified.12		 Learning	allows	the	PBLM	to	identify	how	the	spread	of	panic	at	the	individual	level	can	translate	into	patterns	on	a	larger	scale.	While	consumers	technically	panic	individually	in	the	DD	model,	they	all	share	the	same	information	and	draw	the	same	conclusion	at	the	same	time.	Either	no	one	panics	in	the	DD	model	(the	good	risk	sharing	equilibrium)	or	everyone	panics	and	the	bank	fails	(the	bad	bank	run	equilibrium).	The	DD	does	not	provide	for	any	middle	ground	where																																																									11	DD	(1983)	p.403.	12	Panics	are	bad	in	very	similar	ways	to	bank	runs.	Using	terminology	of	the	DD	model,	a	type	2	consumer	could	unnecessarily	panic	and	withdraw	her	assets	after	one	period.	This	would	be	an	inefficient	outcome	given	that	she	could	have	held	the	asset	longer	and	received	a	higher	payout.	
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some	consumers	may	panic	but	others	may	not.	The	PBLM	is	able	to	provide	this	middle	ground	when	consumers	have	only	limited	information	to	act	upon.	Further,	this	information	is	transmitted	to	and	from	a	social	network	like	process	like	what	was	empirically	supported	by	Kelly	and	O	Grada	regarding	two	bank	runs	in	the	1850s.	The	PBLM	applies	this	idea	of	networking	via	proximity	based	learning	to	the	standard	DD	framework.	The	results	of	this	study	support	that	proximity	based	learning	is	an	effective	method	of	panic	transmission	in	light	of	limited	information.	The	results	are	also	consistent	with	the	idea	that	increasing	risk	sharing	increases	the	probability	of	bank	failures.	Most	importantly,	this	paper	finds	that	information	from	limited	sample	sizes	can	cause	consumers	to	inaccurately	diagnose	system	fundamentals	so	increasing	the	visibility	in	the	system	can	prevent	costly,	unnecessary	panics.		 	
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Model	Overview		The	PBLM	is	essentially	the	DD	model	repeated	continuously.	This	will	be	made	clearer	in	following	sections.	In	each	time	period	the	following	actions	are	executed	in	the	order	below.		All	consumers	execute	each	action	in	a	random	order.	E.g.	all	consumers	move	in	some	random	order.	Then	all	consumers	discover	their	net	income	in	a	random	order.	The	order	can	change	from	action	to	action	and	period	to	period.		1.	 Consumers	move	–	Consumers	randomly	move	around	the	bank.	2.	 Bank	pays	operating	cost	if	period	>	0	3.	 Consumers	discover	net	income	for	period		 	 If	net	income	is	positive,	it	is	deposited	it	into	the	bank.		 	 If	net	income	is	negative,	the	consumer	withdraws	assets	from				 	 the	bank	to	cover	deficit.	4.	 Consumers	perform	proximity	based	learning		 	 Consumers	can	decide	to	panic	and	withdraw	all	their	assets	from	the			 	 bank.	5.	 Consumers	pay	back	deficits	6.	 Consumers	go	bankrupt	if	they	have	an	unpaid	deficit	7.	 Bank	goes	bankrupt	if	it	was	unable	to	meet	any	obligations	8.	 Consumer	and	bank	assets	grow	
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Consumer	Net	Income	Overview	
	
	 In	the	beginning	of	each	time	period,	each	consumer	earns	income	Yi,t,	consumes	a	fixed	proportion	of	that	income	Ci,t,	and	faces	a	positive	probability	of	a	negative	monetary	shock	Xi,t.	Together,	in	each	period,	these	three	variables	determine	each	consumer’s	net	income	Ii,t	which	is	described	by	1.	 Ii,t	=	Yi,t	–	Ci,t	–	Xi,t	 	 	
	
Consumer	Gross	Income			 Each	consumer’s	income	is	randomly	drawn	from	a	truncated	normal	distribution	with	mean	Yi*.13	In	doing	this,	the	PBLM	breaks	away	from	the	common	modeling	assumption	that	incomes	are	standard	across	all	agents.	This	is	important	in	that	the	agents	here	are	consumers	that	almost	certainly	have	varying	incomes	in	real	life.	Further,	this	increased	heterogeneity	plays	out	in	meaningful	ways	as	consumers	have	interactions	that	depend	on	their	levels	of	wealth	and	net	incomes.		To	be	exact,	each	consumer’s	income	in	a	single	period	is	randomly	drawn	from	that	consumer’s	normally	distributed	income	curve.	This	is	to	reflect	possible	fluctuations	in	areas	such	as	hours	worked	or	bonuses	accrued	such	that	a	consumer’s	income	is	not	necessarily	constant	over	time.	A	consumer’s	income	curve	is	identical	from	period	to	period	to	represent	the	assumption	that	a	consumer’s	income	is	consistent	over	time.	The	consumer’s	income	curve	is	determined	as	soon	as	the	consumer	is	instantiated.	However,	the	mean	of	each																																																									13	The	distribution	is	truncated	so	that	consumers	only	have	positive	incomes.	
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consumer’s	income	curve	is	initially	and	singularly	randomly	drawn	from	a	truncated	normal	distribution	with	mean	Y*.14	This	step	generates	the	heterogeneity	in	consumer	income	curves.		
Consumer	Consumption		 When	consumers	are	instantiated	and	their	income	curves	determined,	their	level	of	consumption	for	the	entire	simulation	is	also	determined.	Each	consumer’s	level	of	consumption	is	individually	and	randomly	drawn	from	the	same	truncated	normal	distribution	with	mean	γ*	and	remains	constant	throughout	the	model.15,16	Similar	to	the	way	each	consumer’s	income	curve	has	a	mean	initially	drawn	from	a	random	distribution,	this	further	adds	to	the	level	of	heterogeneity	into	the	model	in	a	way	representative	of	actual	consumers	and	meaningful	in	consumer	interactions.	Where	a	consumer’s	income	in	the	period	t	can	be	described	by	Yi,t	and	the	consumer’s	rate	of	consumption	is	γi,	the	consumer’s	consumption	Cit	is	described	by	 2.	 Ci,t	=	γi(Yi,t)	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		An	analogous	argument	to	the	one	above	regarding	the	consistent	but	not	constant	incomes	of	consumers	could	be	made	about	their	levels	of	consumption.	However,	what	are	most	important	to	this	model	are	the	varying	levels	of	wealth																																																									14	Hence	the	expected	mean	of	every	consumer’s	income	curve	is	Y*	before	they	are	instantiated.	15	The	distribution	is	truncated	so	that	no	consumer’s	level	of	consumption	is	greater	than	1	or	less	than	0.	16	The	expected	level	of	consumption	for	each	consumer	is	γ*	before	they	are	instantiated.	
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and	net	income.	Both	of	these	are	already	significantly	affected	by	varying	one’s	income	from	period	to	period.	While	drawing	a	consumer’s	level	of	consumption	each	period	would	certainly	add	to	the	model’s	heterogeneity,	it	does	not	do	so	in	a	way	not	already	captured	by	the	model.17	For	the	sake	of	simplicity,	each	consumer’s	level	of	consumption	is	assumed	to	be	constant	over	time.		
Consumer	Negative	Shocks		 Each	consumer	also	faces	a	positive	probability	λ	of	a	negative	monetary	shock	in	each	period.	These	shocks	are	idiosyncratic	and	proportional	to	the	consumer’s	income	in	the	period.18	Where	the	proportion	of	the	shock	to	the	consumer’s	income	is	Ψ	>	0,	the	monetary	value	of	the	shock	for	a	consumer	in	period	t	Xit	can	be	described	by	
3.	 X!! =   0 𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟−Ψ 𝑌!"  𝑖𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑑𝑜𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟	 	 	 																																																									17	It	could	be	argued	that	varying	income	alone	creates	much	of	the	heterogeneity	needed	in	the	model	and	that	consumption	could	be	constant	across	all	consumers	and	time	periods.	However,	the	benefits	of	making	consumers	more	heterogeneous	in	this	manner	were	deemed	to	outweigh	the	cost	of	making	programmatic	changes	to	the	simulation.	18	Much	thought	was	given	as	to	whether	or	not	there	should	also	be	systemic	shocks	in	the	model.	A	systemic	shock	would	be	interesting,	especially	given	recent	financial	crises.	However,	accurately	reflecting	the	fear	of	a	systemic	shock	in	each	consumer’s	decision	to	panic	is	not	a	simple	task	nor	is	adding	a	systemic	shock	to	the	simulation	at	all.	There	also	arose	the	question	of	the	place	of	a	systemic	shock	in	the	overall	significance	of	the	model.	The	two	main	panic	conditions	compare	liquidity	demands	to	the	bank’s	capitalization	and	the	idea	of	panic	directly	leading	to	more	panic.	A	systemic	shock	would	have	an	impact	on	both	as	it	would	push	liquidity	demands	even	higher,	causing	consumers	to	panic	which,	causes	consumers	to	panic.	But	it	does	not	clearly	add	a	new	element	of	panic	to	the	model	as	it	is	currently	designed.	If	this	model	were	designed	to	analyze	optimization	behavior,	a	systemic	shock	could	have	greater	meaning	depending	on	how	risk	aversion	was	defined	in	the	consumers.	
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This	shock	is	large	enough	such	that	when	it	occurs,	it	is	larger	than	the	consumer’s	expected	savings	(income	–	consumption).19	Thus	the	consumer	will	experience	negative	net	income	or	a	deficit	when	a	shock	occurs.		The	probability	of	the	shock	occurring,	λ,	and	the	proportion	of	the	shock	to	the	consumer’s	income,	Ψ,	are	constant	across	all	consumers	for	the	entire	simulation.	As	mentioned	previously,	an	argument	that	these	should	have	been	idiosyncratic	and	possibly	fluctuating	from	period	to	period	could	have	been	made.	However,	the	heterogeneity	in	income	is	sufficient	for	this	model	such	that	λ	and	Ψ	can	be	held	constant	for	the	sake	of	simplicity.		 This	shock	could	be	thought	of	as	a	medical	emergency	or	any	type	of	large	unforeseen	expense.	It	mirrors	the	DD	in	which	consumers	do	not	know	whether	they	are	type	I	or	type	II	consumers	until	they	need	to	make	a	liquidity	decision.	In	the	PBLM,	consumers	need	extra	liquidity	should	they	be	struck	by	a	shock	in	the	period.	The	random	nature	of	the	shock	is	essential	in	creating	private	risk	for	consumers.	Further,	this	shock	is	directly	uninsurable.20	“An	investor	cannot	buy	direct	insurance	against	his	need	for	liquidity,	because	the	need	is	private	information”	and	thus	unobservable.21	This	risk	creates	the	risk-averse	consistent	behaviors	at	the	cores	of	both	the	DD	model	and	the	PBLM.22	
																																																								19	It	will	later	be	shown	that	λΨ	>	1	–	γ*	in	order	to	keep	the	system	stationary.	20	See	Diamond	and	Dybvig	page	403	for	a	full	explanation	as	to	why	this	shock	is	uninsurable.		21	Diamond	(2007)	p.190.	22	Diamond	(2007)	calls	this	the	uncertain	horizon	of	holding	the	asset.	Consumers	are	able	to	hold	an	asset	that	yields	a	higher	return	if	held	for	two	periods	as	opposed	to	just	one	period.	This	idea	will	be	elaborated	on	in	more	detail	later.	
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Consumer	Net	Income			 A	consumer’s	net	income	Ii,t	is	determined	by	the	consumer’s	income,	the	consumer’s	consumption,	and	whether	or	not	a	shock	is	experienced.	Since	all	these	variables	have	consistent	expected	values	over	time,	E[Ii,s]	=	E[Ii,t]	for	any	periods	s,t.	In	any	period	for	a	specific	consumer,	the	expectation	of	Ii	can	be	written	in	terms	of	Yi	as	shown	below		 4.	 E[Ii]	=	E[Yi](1-	γi	–	λΨ)	 	 	 	 	 	Note	that	before	the	model	is	created	and	consumers	are	instantiated,	all	consumers	are	expected	to	be	identical	so	the	subscript	for	the	consumer	can	be	dropped.	The	expectation	of	any	consumer’s	net	income	in	any	period	is		 5.	 E[I]	=	Y*(1	–	γ*	–	λΨ)		 	 	 	In	a	later	section,	E[I]	will	be	shown	to	be	crucial	in	keeping	the	expected	level	of	wealth	in	the	overall	system	constant	over	time.		 If	a	consumer	has	net	income	such	that	Ii,t	>	0,	they	can	invest	Ii,t	in	an	asset	with	a	two-tiered	return	(a	low	return	if	held	for	one	period	or	a	high	return	if	held	for	two	periods)	and	carry	these	savings	into	the	future.	A	consumer	will	earn	positive	net	income	if	they	do	not	experience	a	negative	shock	since	Xi,t	=	0.	In	this	case,		 	 Ii,t	=	Yi,t	–	Ci,t	
	 	 Ii,t	=	Yi,t	–	γi	Yi,t		 	 Ii,t	=	Yi,t	(1	-	γi)		 where		0	<	γi	 <	1		 6.	 Ii,t	>	0	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
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If	a	consumer	has	net	income	such	that	Ii,t	<	0,	the	deficit	must	be	paid	back	in	the	current	period	through	accumulated	savings;	otherwise	the	consumer	goes	bankrupt	and	must	leave	the	simulation.	As	mentioned	above,	this	deficit	occurs	when	a	consumer	experiences	a	negative	shock.		 The	heterogeneity	in	the	net	incomes	of	consumers	allows	for	the	observation	of	heterogeneous	consumer	interactions	and	how	those	interactions	can	lead	to	bank	panics.			
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Underlying	Asset		
	 At	the	heart	of	this	model	is	an	illiquid	riskless	asset.	The	illiquid	asset	here	is	defined	as	one	that	yields	a	high	return	if	it	is	held	for	a	long	period	or	a	low	return	if	it	is	only	held	for	a	short	period.	If	the	asset	were	held	for	zero	periods,	it	would	simply	return	its	face	value	(or	purchase	price).	This	asset	is	illiquid	because	its	early	liquidation	value	is	less	than	its	full	maturation	value.			 Diamond	and	Dybvig	attribute	the	illiquidity	of	the	asset	to	a	number	of	possible	reasons.	It	could	be	that	the	asset	“provides	low	levels	of	output	per	unit	of	input	if	operated	for	a	single	period	but	high	levels	of	output	if	operated	for	two	periods”23	or	there	are	selling	costs	when	consumers	are	“unexpectedly	forced	to	‘liquidate’	early.”24	The	exact	nature	of	the	illiquidity	is	immaterial	to	both	the	DD	model	and	the	PBLM	so	long	as	the	asset	is	illiquid.	The	real	cost	of	early	liquidation	makes	bank	panics	that	“are	costly	and	reduce	social	welfare	by	interrupting	production	(when	loans	are	called)	and	by	destroying	optimal	risk	sharing	among	depositors.”25	Friedman	and	Schwartz	(1963)	found	that	bank	runs	in	the	1930s	imposed	large	costs	on	the	United	States	economy.	The	PBLM	illiquid	asset	is	in	the	same	vein	as	that	of	the	DD	model.	The	asset	has	a	price	of	1	and	can	be	purchased	fractionally	and	in	unlimited	quantities.26	The	
																																																								23	DD	(1983)	pp.402-403.	24	Ibid	25	Ibid	26	The	supply	of	assets	is	infinite	and	exogenous	to	the	system.	For	the	sake	of	this	model,	banks	are	also	able	to	invest	in	this	underlying	asset.	This	allows	banks	a	greater	level	of	autonomy	needed	to	operate	in	an	environment	with	an	unbounded	number	of	periods.	It	is	unclear	whether	or	not	this	type	of	operation	would	be	permissible	in	the	original	DD	model.	In	the	DD	model,	consumers	provide	the	
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illiquid	asset	here	yields	a	full	maturity	return	βb	if	it	is	held	for	two	periods,	or	a	lower	return	αb	if	the	asset	is	liquidated	before	maturity	after	only	one	period.	The	holding	duration	does	not	need	to	be	determined	a	priori	and	the	return	is	determined	solely	by	the	holding	duration.	The	PBLM	returns	follow	the	inequality	βb	>	1	and	βb	>	αb	>	0.	The	lower	the	ratio	!!!!	(ceteris	paribus),	the	more	illiquid	the	asset.	Further,		7.	 βb	>	αb2		 	 	 	 	 	 	The	above	indicates	that	the	holder	of	the	asset	receives	a	greater	payoff	for	holding	the	asset	for	two	periods	consecutively	as	opposed	to	holding	it	for	one	period,	liquidating	it,	and	then	reinvesting	it	for	a	second	period.	Thus	there	exists	a	real	penalty	for	liquidating	the	asset	before	full	maturity.		The	cost	of	liquidating	an	asset	after	one	period	instead	of	two	is	the	difference	in	returns,	so	it	has	a	value	of		8.	 βb	-	αb	>	0	From	hereafter,	this	underlying	asset	will	also	be	referred	to	as	the	bank	asset.	The	reasoning	for	this	new	name	will	be	fully	described	in	the	next	section.	In	essence,	this	is	the	asset	that	banks	hold	and	use	to	offer	a	more	liquid	asset	that	a	sufficiently	risk-averse	consumer	would	prefer.		 	
																																																																																																																																																																					underlying	assets	for	the	bank.	However,	this	could	easily	be	the	case	of	the	bank	having	no	initial	endowment	so	it	is	unable	to	obtain	any	assets	independently	of	receiving	deposits	from	consumers.	Thus	the	ability	of	the	bank	to	obtain	assets	directly	should	it	have	the	resources	appears	to	be	a	natural	extension	of	the	DD	model.	The	supply	of	assets	is	abstracted	away	in	the	DD	model	so	it	will	be	handled	similarly	in	the	PBLM.	
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Consumer	Asset		 Diamond	found	“sufficiently	risk-averse	investors,	but	not	risk-neutral	investors,	are	willing	to	give	up	some	expected	return	to	get	a	more	liquid	asset.”27	“Sufficiently”	depends	on	the	differences	between	the	full	maturity	and	the	early	liquidation	returns	as	well	as	the	probability	of	the	negative	shock	occurring.28		The	negative	shock	has	already	been	identified	as	not	directly	insurable	due	to	its	unobservable	nature.	However,	banks	are	able	to	pool	the	underlying	assets	and	create	a	more	liquid	asset	that	provides	more	utility	to	sufficiently	risk-averse	consumers.29	“In	this	role,	banks	can	be	viewed	as	providing	[indirect]	insurance	that	allows	agents	to	consume	when	they	need	to	most.”30	This	more	liquid	asset	will	be	referred	to	as	the	consumer	asset	since	it	will	effectively	be	the	only	asset	consumers	hold	via	the	bank.31	Let	the	consumer	asset	yield	a	full	maturity	return	of	βc	if	held	for	two	periods,	or	a	lower	return	of	αc	if	the	asset	is	liquidated	before	maturity	after	only	one	period.	All	rules	applied	to	the	underlying	asset	still	apply	to	the	consumer	asset.	Thus	βc	>	αc	>	0	and	βc	>	αc2	and																																																									27	Diamond	(2007)	p.192.	28	This	statement	should	be	analyzed	by	observing	the	decisions	investors	make	to	optimize	their	returns.	The	problem	of	optimization	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper	as	it	would	require	much	more	complex	decision	making	rules	than	what	the	PBLM	currently	uses.	More	specifically,	the	optimizing	consumer	would	most	likely	not	choose	to	invest	all	of	his	or	her	resources	into	the	liquid	asset	as	this	would	expose	the	consumer	to	a	positive	probability	of	a	bank	run.	Calculating	this	probability	is	likely	intractable	in	a	model	as	dynamic	as	the	PBLM	but	it	would	be	necessary	for	a	consumer	to	optimize.	Instead	the	consumer	would	invest	a	portion	of	their	assets	in	the	riskless	underlying	asset	directly	and	hold	the	other	portion	in	the	bank’s	liquid	asset.	29	Diamond	(2007)	pp.191-192.	Diamond	provides	a	concrete	example	where	this	is	true	.	30	DD	(1983)	p.405.	31	The	underlying	asset	is	called	the	bank	asset	by	this	same	reasoning.	
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the	real	penalty	for	liquidating	the	consumer	asset	before	full	maturity	has	a	value	of	 9.	 βc	-	αc	>	0.	Since	this	consumer	asset	is	more	liquid	than	the	bank	asset,		10.	 !!!! >  !!!!	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 Essentially,	the	bank	takes	the	relatively	illiquid	underlying	asset	and	creates	a	new	asset	with	a	higher	return	after	one	period,	but	a	lower	return	after	two	periods	compared	to	the	underlying	asset.	Mathematically,	this	statement	means		 11.	 βb	>	βc	 	 	 	 	 	 	 		 12.	 αb	<	αc.	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	This	allows	consumers	to	access	the	higher	two	period	return	after	just	one	period	should	they	suffer	a	negative	shock	and	need	extra	liquidity.	This	set	of	the	bank	asset	returns	and	consumer	asset	returns	can	be	thought	of	as	the	banking	contract	or	demand	deposit	contract	between	banks	and	consumers.		 Notice	that	when	consumers	liquidate	their	assets	after	a	single	period,	the	bank	experiences	a	real	loss	with	a	value	of	αc	-	αb	>	0.	When	consumers	wait	until	their	assets	fully	mature,	the	bank	earns	a	real	profit	with	value	βb	-	βc	>	0.32	In	the	DD	model,	the	bank	is	a	mutual	bank	meaning	that	consumers	“not	withdrawing	in	period	1	get	a	pro	rata	share	of	the	bank’s	assets	in	period	2.”33	While	this	is	
																																																								32	It	will	be	discussed	later,	but	this	mismatch	of	returns	exposes	all	agents	to	bank	failures.	33	DD	(1983)	p.408.	The	banks	return	all	profits	to	the	consumers.	This	would	mean	a	type	2	consumer	receives	either	no	return	in	the	event	of	a	bank	failure	or	a	return	equal	to	the	bank’s	remaining	assets	divided	by	the	number	of	type	2	consumers.	
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certainly	reasonable	for	a	3	period	(single	cycle)	model,	it	does	not	make	sense	for	a	model	with	an	unbounded	number	of	periods.	In	the	PBLM,	banks	carry	over	any	profits	from	period	to	period	and	reinvest	them	to	better	meet	any	future	obligations.34		 In	the	PBLM,	banks	are	not	able	to	provide	this	liquidity	service	without	cost.	Each	bank	must	pay	an	amount	D	>	0	each	period.	This	can	be	considered	as	the	operating	cost	of	the	bank.	This	is	not	unreasonable,	as	one	would	expect	such	a	system	to	at	least	need	a	highly	capable	teller	handling	consumer	deposits	and	withdrawals.35		This	operating	cost	does	not	exist	in	the	DD	model,	but	it	is	not	a	significant	change	to	the	model.	As	described	in	the	previous	paragraph	and	footnote	33,	this	would	be	a	decrease	in	the	bank’s	worth	after	period	1.	This	would	simply	lead	to	slightly	lower	returns	to	type	2	consumers	in	a	way	that	does	not	thematically	change	the	model.	This	will	be	made	clearer	in	the	following	section	on	DD	equilibria.		 	
																																																																																																																																																																					There	are	also	other	DD	assumptions	made	about	each	consumer	initially	having	the	same	endowment	and	they	only	liquidate	their	assets	in	their	entirety.		34	See	footnote	15	for	an	explanation	on	why	PBLM	banks	are	able	to	directly	invest	in	the	underlying	asset.	35	DD	(1983)	elected	to	make	the	underlying	asset	illiquid	through	the	imposition	of	some	unknown	cost	in	a	perfectly	logical	manner.	That	same	logic	is	now	also	being	applied	to	the	banks	in	that	operating	banks	should	not	be	cost	free.	
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Diamond	and	Dybvig	Equilibria		
Diamond	and	Dybvig	Tipping	Point			 In	the	DD	model,	if	a	large	enough	proportion	of	the	consumer	population	elects	to	withdraw	their	consumer	assets	after	just	one	period,	the	bank	cannot	possibly	meet	all	of	its	obligations,	as	the	value	of	its	assets	will	be	less	than	the	value	of	its	liabilities.	Consider	the	case	where	100	consumers	each	have	$1	so	they	collectively	deposit	$100	into	the	bank.	After	one	period,	the	bank’s	assets	have	a	present	value	of	αb($100)	but	liabilities	with	a	present	value	of	αc($100)	and	αb	<	αc.	If	the	proportion	of	type	1	consumers,	who	fully	withdraw	their	money	from	the	bank	after	one	period,	T1,	is	large	enough	such	that		 13.	 β!  = !! ( !!! !! !! )!!(!!!!)  <  α! 	 	 	 	 	 	 36	the	bank	will	fail.	If	βc	<	αc,	all	consumers,	not	just	type	1	consumers,	have	an	incentive	to	withdraw	their	assets	after	one	period	instead	of	waiting	another	period	to	receive	a	lower	return.	Thus	all	consumers	would	attempt	to	withdraw	their	money	after	one	period.		Essentially,	bank	runs	occur	any	time	that	withdrawals	in	period	one	are	too	large.	At	this	point,	the	bank’s	leftover	assets	are	so	small	that	when	they	are	evenly	distributed	among	the	remaining	consumers	in	period	two,	those	consumers	receive	a	return	less	than	what	they	could	have	received	from	the	bank	after	just	one	period,	αc.	Thus	the	benefit	of	waiting	an	additional	period	to	receive	returns	is	now																																																									36	This	follows	the	idea	that	type	2	consumers	receive	a	pro	rata	share	of	the	bank’s	remaining	assets	as	described	previously.	The	operating	cost	mentioned	in	the	previous	section	would	decrease	the	total	remaining	assets	for	the	bank	(the	numerator)	such	that	consumers	would	receive	a	lower	βc.	
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negative	so	all	consumers	would	attempt	to	withdraw	their	money	after	one	period	regardless	of	their	type.		
Sequential	Service	Constraint			 Both	the	DD	and	PBLM	operate	under	the	sequential	service	constraint.	In	Diamond	and	Dybvig’s	words,	this	means		 “Withdrawal	tenders	are	served	sequentially	in	random	order	until	the	bank	runs	out	of	assets.	This	approach	allows	us	to	capture	the	flavor	of	continuous	time	(in	which	depositors	deposit	and	withdraw	at	different	random	times)	in	a	discrete	model.”37		 Consider	Consumer	A	and	Consumer	B	waiting	in	line	to	withdraw	their	money	from	the	bank.	If	Consumer	A	withdraws	the	last	$10	of	the	bank’s	assets,	Consumer	B	and	every	consumer	after	him	will	receive	nothing	from	the	bank	and	lose	their	entire	savings.	Thus	if	consumers	realize	that	their	collective	withdrawals	are	large	enough38	relative	to	the	value	of	the	bank’s	assets,	they	have	an	incentive	to	withdraw	all	of	their	money	from	the	bank	regardless	of	their	personal	liquidity	needs.39	This	is	how	Diamond	and	Dybvig	and	the	PBLM	define	a	consumer	panicking.40		 In	the	DD	model,	at	the	tipping	proportion	of	type	1	consumers	T1	(described	above)	or	any	proportion	larger	than	T1,	all	consumers	panic	and	make	a	run	on	the	
																																																								37	DD	(1983)	p.408.	38	“Large	enough”	as	defined	by	the	tipping	point	mentioned	earlier.	39	Consumers	do	not	want	to	be	the	last	ones	holding	that	hot	potato	that	is	a	worthless	IOU.	40	This	idea	of	panicking	will	be	addressed	more	thoroughly	later	in	this	paper.	
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bank,	causing	a	bank	failure.41	This	tipping	point	is	unavoidable	due	to	the	nature	of	an	effective	banking	contract.	“A	demand	deposit	contract	which	is	not	subject	to	runs	provides	no	liquidity	services.”42	As	long	as	the	liquidities	of	the	underlying	asset	and	asset	offered	to	consumers	do	not	perfectly	match,	there	exists	a	positive	probability	of	a	bank	run	since	in	theory	all	consumers	could	elect	to	redeem	all	assets	at	the	higher	bank	return	which	is	greater	than	the	actual	return	of	the	assets.	
	 Extending	this	idea	to	the	PBLM,	the	tipping	point	is	deemed	to	be	when	the	bank’s	assets	are	not	sufficient	to	cover	expected	obligations	in	the	next	period	(and	the	current	period	too).	At	this	point,	consumers	expect	the	bank	to	be	unable	to	service	all	withdrawal	requests	in	the	immediate	future.	In	this	situation,	consumers	will	panic	and	withdraw	their	money	early	to	avoid	being	among	those	consumers	that	will	lose	all	assets	when	the	bank	fails.		 Diamond	and	Dybvig	call	this	the	bank	run	equilibrium.	It	“provides	allocations	that	are	worse	for	all	agents	than	they	would	have	obtained	without	the	bank	(trading	in	the	competitive	market)”	because	“all	production	is	interrupted	at	T	=	1	when	it	is	optimal	for	some	to	continue	until	T	=2.”43	Further,	any	consumers	that	are	not	served	by	the	time	the	bank	runs	out	of	assets	receive	no	return	at	all	and	lose	the	entire	value	of	their	initial	investment.		 If	the	tipping	point	of	withdrawals	is	not	reached,	consumers	will	not	panic	and	there	will	be	no	bank	run.	Diamond	and	Dybvig	refer	to	this	as	the	efficient	risk																																																									41	This	idea	of	all	consumers	panicking	together	will	be	explored	more	in	depth.	This	idea	makes	the	terms	bank	panics	and	bank	failures	synonymous	in	the	DD	as	consumers	only	panic	if	the	bank	is	going	to	fail	and	if	the	bank	is	going	to	fail,	consumers	panic.	42	DD	(1983)	p.409.	43	Ibid	
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sharing	or	good	equilibrium.	In	this	outcome,	the	consumers	that	needed	the	extra	liquidity	were	able	to	obtain	it	and	the	consumers	that	were	not	shocked	are	able	to	tap	into	the	higher	full	maturity	return	of	their	investment	while	still	having	protected	themselves	from	the	potential	shock.		 It	is	interesting	to	note	that	the	sequential	service	constraint	is	actually	only	present	in	period	1	of	the	DD	model.	The	idea	of	the	pro-rata	share	eliminates	the	sequential	service	constraint	in	period	2.	This	change	is	unaddressed	by	Diamond	and	Dybvig.	However,	it	is	reflective	of	their	uses	of	mutual	banks,	a	“flexible”	banking	contract,	an	abstraction	of	true	risk-aversion	and	optimization,	the	fact	that	there	are	exactly	3	periods,	and	homogeneity	assumptions	about	consumers.	Under	the	assumption	that	the	banks	are	mutual	banks,	it	is	logical	that	each	consumer	should	receive	a	pro-rata	share	of	assets	assuming	they	put	in	the	same	amount	initially	as	Diamond	and	Dybvig	assume.	The	flexibility	of	the	banking	contract	is	shown	in	equation	13.44	The	full	maturity	return	consumers	expect,	βc,	does	not	actually	have	a	definite	value.	βc	is	essentially	a	function	of	the	proportion	of	consumers	that	are	type	1.		If	the	consumers	were	promised	at	least	an	actual	value	for	βc	(let	it	be	βc*),	the	tipping	point	would	change	to		 	14.	 !! ( !!! !! !! )!!(!!!!)  <  β!∗ 	This	would	reflect	the	fact	that	even	if	the	pro	rata	share	of	bank	assets	in	period	2	is	larger	than	αc,	each	consumer	would	be	entitled	to	βc*	>	αc.	Thus	the	pro	rata	share																																																									44	There	is	no	strict	value	of	β! .	It	is	simply	the	pro-rata	share	of	all	leftover	assets	in	period	2.	It	is	considered	flexible	because	it	depends	on	withdrawals	in	period	1.		
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must	be	at	least	βc*	as	is	reflected	in	equation	14.	If	the	pro	rata	share	were	between	αc	and	βc*	exclusive,	under	the	sequential	service	constraint	at	least	one	consumer	would	not	receive	the	full	βc*.45	Hence,	consumers	correctly	fearing	that	they	might	not	receive	a	return	after	two	periods	would	panic	in	period	1	and	withdraw	all	their	money	then.46		 The	pro-rata	return	is	certainly	reasonable	given	that	the	DD	model	only	has	three	periods.	After	period	2,	the	model	ends	so	the	bank,	consumers,	and	assets	all	disappear.	However,	in	the	PBLM	where	there	is	an	unbounded	number	of	possible	periods,	consumers	must	have	a	definite	full	maturity	return.	The	idea	of	a	pro	rata	return	does	not	fit	a	model	where	assets	can	carry	over	from	period	to	period.	This	carryover	prevents	the	PBLM	from	having	any	rest	points	similar	to	period	2	in	the	DD	model.	Without	a	defined	stopping	point,	there	can	be	no	final	distribution	of	assets.		Since	the	PBLM	model	extends	the	number	of	periods	in	the	DD	model,	it	is	only	natural	that	the	idea	of	a	pro	rata	return	be	replaced	by	a	definite	full	maturity	return.	This	extension	is	reflected	in	comparisons	of	the	new	tipping	point	in	equation	14	and	the	old	tipping	point	in	equation	13.	Both	reflect	the	idea	that	consumers	have	behaviors	that	are	consistent	with	risk	aversion	and	utility																																																									45	All	consumers	would	attempt	to	receive	a	share	of	βc*.	Under	the	sequential	service	constraint,	all	consumers	would	receive	the	full	βc*	so	long	as	the	bank	had	the	assets.	By	the	pigeonhole	principle,	this	necessitates	that	at	least	one	consumer	would	receive	a	share	less	than	βc*.		46	This	statement	is	somewhat	untrue	given	that	true	risk	aversion	does	not	exist	in	the	model.	The	impetus	for	seeking	to	avoid	losing	one’s	money	implies	that	there	is	some	utility	possibly	derived	from	having	money.	Although	that	utility	function	is	not	defined	in	the	PBLM	(or	DD	in	specific	terms),	consumers	behave	consistently	with	risk	aversion	(i.e.	they	derive	some	utility	from	holding	money	so	they	seek	to	avoid	losing	it	in	a	bank	failure).	
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maximization	in	their	given	situations.47	Incorporating	the	bank’s	operating	cost	D	into	equation	14	yields	the	first	form	of	the	PBLM	tipping	point	proportion	T1*	15.	 !! ( !!! !! !! !!)!!(!!!!)  <  β!∗ 	 	 	 	 	 	 48		
Risk	Averse	Behavior			 In	the	DD	model,	consumers	are	risk	averse.	The	important	result	of	their	risk	aversion	is	that	if	consumers	are	of	type	1	(analogous	to	being	shocked	in	the	PBLM),	they	prematurely	withdraw	their	money	from	the	bank	because	their	utility	function	is	only	dependent	on	consumption	in	period	1.	“If	investors	were	not	risk	averse	and	had	constant	marginal	utility	of	consumption,	they	would	not	prefer”	to	hold	the	more	liquid	asset.49	Diamond	and	Dybvig	derive	mathematically	how	under	certain	assumptions	about	the	utility	functions	of	consumers,	a	sufficiently	liquid	asset	is	desirable.	However,	the	exact	level	of	or	definition	of	risk	aversion	is	not	important	to	fundamental	structure	of	the	model	as	long	as	it	is	known	to	exist.50		 In	the	PBLM,	the	desire	to	avoid	bankruptcy	makes	consumers	risk	averse.	An	unpaid	deficit	would	mean	bankruptcy	which	means	the	consumer	is	forced	to	leave	the	simulation.	Thus	consumers	are	willing	to	liquidate	any	assets	to	pay	off	
																																																								47	i.e.	consumers	want	to	avoid	getting	a	lower	return	than	what	is	sensible	in	the	case	of	DD	or	than	what	is	guaranteed	in	the	case	of	the	PBLM.		48	It	will	later	be	shown	that	the	PBLM	tipping	point	is	different	from	equation	15	due	to	the	relaxation	of	several	DD	assumptions	and	differences	in	the	models.	49	Diamond	(2007)	p.192.	Although	Diamond	says	this	about	a	concrete	example,	it	is	widely	applicable	to	these	banking	contracts.	50	See	footnote	28.	
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deficits	regardless	of	the	maturities	of	those	assets.51	Therefore	consumers	prefer	the	more	liquid	asset.52	This	risk	averse	behavior	even	drives	them	to	accept	a	lower	expected	return	over	finite	periods	of	time	through	the	consumer	asset	as	opposed	to	holding	the	higher	yield	underlying	asset	directly.53		 In	the	DD	model,	the	idea	of	risk	aversion	and	optimization	is	somewhat	abstracted	away.	They	note	that		“[Sufficiently	risk	averse]	agents	will	choose	to	deposit	at	least	some	of	their	wealth	in	the	bank	even	if	they	anticipate	a	positive	probability	of	a	run,	provided	that	the	probability	is	small	enough,	because	the	good	equilibrium	dominates	holding	assets	directly.”54	
	They	do	not	attempt	to	identify	what	portion	of	wealth	consumers	would	deposit	in	the	bank	or	what	portion	consumers	would	hold	directly	in	underlying	assets.	That	question	is	beyond	the	scope	of	their	model.	True	risk	aversion	and	optimization	will	also	be	considered	beyond	the	scope	of	the	PBLM.55	While	the	PBLM	does	not	
																																																								51	A	risk	averse	consumer’s	utility	function	in	the	PBLM	could	be	one	in	which	utility	is	dependent	on	how	many	periods	the	consumer	survives	in	the	simulation.	Hence	in	each	period,	the	consumer	maximizes	his	utility	by	liquidating	any	assets	necessary	to	prevent	bankruptcy	and	extend	his	stimulation	time.	He	also	maximizes	utility	by	carrying	as	much	assets	into	the	next	period	so	as	to	pay	off	future	deficits.	Thus	it	is	in	the	PBLM	consumer’s	best	interest	to	pay	off	deficits	and	avoid	bank	failure	so	he	can	have	as	much	money	as	possible.	52	Again,	this	statement	could	be	proved	mathematically	with	defined	risk	aversion.	The	PBLM	assumes	risk	averse	consistent	behavior	such	that	this	is	true.	53	Over	infinite	periods	of	time,	the	expected	returns	are	both	infinite.	54	DD	(1983)	p.409-410.	55	The	PBLM	consumer’s	panic	conditions	are	not	based	on	truly	rational	expectations.	Consumers	have	ad-hoc	expectations	based	largely	on	their	personal	information	as	well	as	whatever	they	glean	from	their	proximity	based	learning.	This	idea	is	consistent	with	the	fact	that	consumers	are	often	not	perfectly	rational	but	act	logically	according	to	what	they	can	feasibly	comprehend.	
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have	explicit	risk	aversion,	consumers’	behaviors	and	ad	hoc	expectations	are	consistent	with	risk	aversion.56	
Short	Term	Assets	and	Long	Term	Assets57			 From	this	point	on,	both	consumer	and	bank	assets	that	have	been	held	for	zero	periods	will	be	referred	to	as	short	term	assets.	Both	consumer	and	bank	assets	that	have	been	held	for	one	period	will	be	referred	to	as	long	term	assets.	When	long	term	assets	are	held	for	an	additional	period	(two	periods	total),	they	are	converted	into	short	term	assets	at	β	times	face	value	where	they	are	then	considered	to	have	been	held	for	zero	periods.		 In	the	previously	defined	consumer	asset,	when	a	consumer	has	invested	her	$100	into	the	underlying	asset	in	period	t,	she	is	now	said	to	hold	$100	in	short	term	assets	which	can	be	liquidated	in	period	t	for	$100.	In	period	t+1,	these	short	term	assets	are	rolled	over	into	long	term	assets	with	the	original	face	value	of	$100.	These	long	term	assets	can	be	liquidated	in	period	t+1	for	α($100)	where	α	is	the	return	on	consumer	assets	held	for	one	period.	If	the	consumer	holds	those	long	term	assets	for	an	additional	period,	they	are	converted	back	into	short	term	assets	at	β	times	the	face	value	of	$100	so	she	now	has	short	term	assets	with	face	value	β($100)	in	period	t	+	2	where	β	is	the	return	on	consumer	assets	held	for	two	periods.	These	“new”	short	term	assets	are	treated	like	any	other	short	term	assets	so	she	could	liquidate	them	at	their	face	value	of	β($100).																																																										56	Ad	hoc	expectations	are	discussed	in	the	Proximity	Based	Learning	section.	57	In	this	section,	the	subscripts	on	the	asset	returns	are	dropped.	The	principles	described	are	applicable	to	both	consumer	assets	and	bank	assets.	
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	 This	change	from	the	original	asset	terminology	to	the	new	short	term	assets	and	long	term	assets	may	seem	unnecessary	upon	first	glance.	However,	from	a	programmatic	sense,	short	term	and	long	term	assets	are	much	easier	to	manage	than	a	single	asset	with	a	two-tiered	set	of	returns.58	Also,	this	new	terminology	better	fits	a	system	with	an	unbounded	number	of	periods	as	opposed	to	the	DD	model	which	had	exactly	three	periods.			 If	one	were	to	extend	the	DD	model	as	the	PBLM	does,	in	the	third	period,	the	underlying	asset	after	being	held	for	two	periods	would	just	be	liquidated	at	β	times	the	original	face	value	and	then	reinvested	as	new	underlying	assets	with	face	value	β	times	the	original	face	value.	Upon	reaching	maturity	in	the	third	period,	the	underlying	asset	is	really	just	treated	like	the	consumer’s	initial	endowment	in	the	first	period	which	was	only	worth	its	face	value.	This	has	the	same	effect	as	holding	long	term	assets	for	an	additional	period	and	then	converting	those	long	term	assets	into	short	term	assets	at	β	times	face	value.	Thus	the	short	term/long	term	system	is	a	natural	extension	of	the	original	DD	model	to	the	PBLM	which	has	additional	periods.		 The	table	on	the	next	page	indicates	the	analogs	between	the	original	terminology	and	the	new	terminology.	Notice	that	the	liquidation	or	present	values	for	holdings	in	the	same	row	are	equivalent.	The	liquidation	values	capture	the	present	worth	of	the	assets,	thus	the	holdings	in	the	same	rows	are	equivalent.		 	
																																																								58	It	is	really	a	three-tiered	system	if	one	includes	liquidating	after	0	periods.	
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Table	0:	Asset	Conversions		 Face	Value	 Liquidation	Value	 	 Face	Value	 Liquidation	Value	Holding	$100	in	underlying	assets	for	0	periods	
$100	 $100	 Holding	$100	in	short	term	assets	
$100	 $100	
Holding	$100	in	underlying	assets	for	1	period	
$100	 α($100)	 Holding	$100	in	long	term	assets	
$100	 α($100)	
Holding	$100	in	underlying	assets	for	2	periods	
$100	 β($100)	 Holding	β	($100)	in	short	term	assets	
β($100)	 β($100)	
	Table	0	describes	the	analogs	between	original	asset	terminology	and	short	term	and	long	term	asset.	 	
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Asset	Liquidation59		 As	mentioned	in	the	previous	section	on	consumer	net	income,	consumers	face	the	possibility	of	a	negative	monetary	shock	in	any	period.	Hence	they	may	need	resources	now	to	pay	off	any	deficit	in	the	current	period.	An	event	of	this	nature	could	cause	the	consumer	to	liquidate	a	portion	of	their	assets	after	just	one	period	even	though	they	would	have	to	pay	the	aforementioned	early	liquidation	penalty.60	However,	the	utility-maximizing	consumer	would	always	attempt	to	liquidate	any	short	term	assets	before	liquidating	any	long	term	assets.61		Consider	the	following	example	where	Consumer	A	has	short	term	assets	with	a	face	value	of	$100,	long	term	assets	with	a	face	value	of	$100,	and	a	deficit	of	$40	in	the	current	period.	Let	long	term	assets	be	liquidated	at	1.1	times	their	face	value	and	converted	into	short	term	assets	at	1.4	times	their	face	value	if	held	for	an	additional	period.	If	Consumer	A	first	liquidates	her	short	term	assets,	she	must	cash	in	short	term	assets	with	a	face	value	of	$40	(present	value	of	$40),	leaving	her	with	short	term	assets	with	a	face	value	of	$60	and	long	term	assets	with	a	face	value	of	$100.	In	the	next	period	excluding	any	net	income,	Consumer	A	has	short	term	assets	with	a	face	value	of	$140	and	long	term	assets	with	a	face	value	of	$60	for	a	total	present	value	of	$224.	Now	suppose	Consumer	A	had	first	liquidated	her	long	term	assets.	To	do	so	she	must	have	cashed	in	long	term	assets	with	a	face	value	of	$36.36	(present	value																																																									59	In	this	section,	the	subscripts	on	the	asset	returns	are	dropped.	The	principles	described	are	applicable	to	both	consumer	assets	and	bank	assets.	60	See	Equation	9.	61	This	is	consistent	with	the	rough	description	of	risk	aversion	in	the	PBLM	in	footnote	51.	
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of	$40),	leaving	her	with	short	term	assets	with	a	face	value	of	$100	and	long	term	assets	with	a	face	value	of	$63.64.	In	the	next	period	excluding	any	net	income,	Consumer	A	has	short	term	assets	with	a	face	value	of	$89.10	and	long	term	assets	with	a	face	value	of	$100	for	a	total	present	value	of	$199.10.	The	example	above	highlights	the	real	benefit	of	liquidating	one’s	most	liquid	assets	(their	short	term	assets)	before	one’s	less	liquid	assets	(their	long	term	assets).	This	benefit	holds	because	the	marginal	benefit	of	holding	short	term	assets	with	a	face	value	of	$1	an	additional	period	is	α	-	1	whereas	holding	long	term	assets	with	a	face	value	of	$1	an	additional	period	has	a	marginal	benefit	of	β	–	α.	β	–	α	is	always	greater	than	α	–	1	as	long	as	β	>	1,	β		>	α	>	0,	and	β	>	α2,	the	two	previously	stated	conditions	on	the	asset	returns.62	This	concept	will	now	be	explained	algebraically	in	the	context	of	the	PBLM.	Suppose	Consumer	A	has	short	term	assets	with	face	value	St	and	long	term	assets	with	face	value	Lt.	Consumer	A	is	shocked	and	has	negative	net	income	It	in	period	t.	She	first	attempts	to	offset	her	net	income	It	with	her	short	term	assets	St.	If	|It|	≤	St,	then	the	consumer’s	remaining	short	term	assets	are	St	+	It.	If	|It|	<	St,	the	consumer	initially	uses	all	of	her	short	term	assets	such	that	she	has	0	short	term	assets	remaining	and	a	leftover	deficit	of	St	+	It.	She	then	attempts	to	pay	the	leftover	deficit	by	liquidating	any	long	term	assets	at	a	rate	of	αc	times	their	face	value.	Hence	the	consumer	must	liquidate	|St	+	It|	/	αc	in	face	value	of	long	term	assets	to	pay	the	deficit.	If	she	has	fewer	than	|St	+	It|	/	αc	in	face	value	of	long	term	assets,	she	
																																																								62	See	the	section	on	underlying	asset	returns.	The	proof	is	simple	if	the	substitutions	βb	=	1	+	β	and	αb	=	1	+	α	are	plugged	into	equation	7.	
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liquidates	all	of	her	long	term	assets	to	pay	off	as	much	of	the	deficit	as	she	can	before	she	will	later	go	bankrupt	in	the	period.	Similarly,	banks	also	choose	to	liquidate	their	short	term	assets	before	any	long	term	assets	to	pay	off	any	obligations.	
Asset	Conversions63			 Consumers	are	able	to	invest	any	net	positive	income	into	their	bank.	In	any	period	t,	a	consumer’s	net	income,	Ii,t,	is	described	by	16.	 Ii,t	=	Yi,t	–	Ci,t	–	Xi,t	 	 	 	 	 	 	Ii,t	can	be	considered	as	the	first	part	of	the	potential	change	in	a	consumer’s	short	term	assets	in	period	t.	Should	the	consumer	hold	any	long	term	assets	in	period	t-1,	in	period	t,	those	assets	are	converted	into	short	term	assets	at	the	long	term	return	β.	However,	any	long	term	assets	held	in	period	t-1	would	necessitate	that	the	same	face	value	amount	of	short	term	assets	had	been	held	in	period	t-2.	Hence	in	period	t,	the	total	amount	of	short	term	assets,	Ji,t,	is	described	recursively	by	17.	 Ji,t	=	Ii,t	+	β(Ji,t-2)	for	t	≥	2	 	 	 	 	 	 64	
For	periods	0	and	1,	 let	L*	be	the	consumer’s	initial	face	value	endowment	of	long	term	assets.	Let	S*	be	the	consumer’s	initial	face	value	endowment	of	short	term	assets,	so	we	have	
18.	 Ji,0	=	Ii,0	+	S*		 	 	 	 	 	 																																																									63	In	this	section,	the	subscripts	on	the	asset	returns	are	dropped.	The	principles	described	are	applicable	to	both	consumer	assets	and	bank	assets.	64	This	only	holds	if	Jt	≥	0	for	all	t.	E[Jt]	>	0	for	all	t.	
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	 19.	 Ji,1	=	Ii,1	+	β	(L*)		 	 	 	 	 	 65			 Any	short	term	assets	held	in	the	previous	period	are	rolled	over	into	long	term	assets	in	the	current	period.	Thus	the	total	amount	of	long	term	assets	in	period	t,	Li,t,	can	be	described	by		 20.	 Li,t	=	Ji,t-1	for	t		≥	1	 	 	 	 	 	 	 66		 Since	short	term	assets	are	liquidated	at	face	value	and	long	term	assets	can	be	liquidated	in	the	current	period	at	the	short	term	return	α,	the	present	value	of	a	consumer’s	total	assets	in	period	t,	Ki,t,	is	described	by		 Ki,t	=	α(Lt)	+	β(Ji,t-2)	+	Ii,t	for	t	≥	2,	substituting	equation	20	yields	 	21.	 Ki,t	=	α(Ji,t-1)	+	Ji,t	for	t	≥	2	 	 	 	 	 	 67	 	For	periods	0	and	1,		 22.	 Ki,0	=	Ii,0	+	S*	+	α	(L*)		 	 	 	 	 	23.	 Ki,1	=		Ii,1	+	α(J0)	+		β	(L*)	 with	the	substitution	in	equation	18	 	Although	subscripts	indicating	that	these	are	values	specific	to	each	consumer	are	included,	the	expectation	of	each	consumer’s	attributes	are	identical	before	the	consumers	are	instantiated.	Thus	the	subscripts	indicating	the	consumer	can	be	dropped	when	expectations	are	taken.	The	time	subscript	on	net	income	could	also	be	dropped	as	described	in	the	Net	Income	section.	Bank	assets	convert	similarly	to	the	consumer	assets	using	the	bank	rates	instead	of	the	consumer	rates.																																																									65	There	is	no	subscript	on	either	initial	endowment	as	it	will	be	the	same	for	every	consumer.	66	Assuming	Ji,t-1	≥	0.	If	Ji,t-1	<	0,	Li,t	=	0;	67	Assuming	Ji,t-1	≥	0.	
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Stationarity		
	 This	section	discusses	the	expectations	of	numerous	variables	under	the	condition	of	stationarity.	To	simplify	the	notation,	let	the	expectations	of	any	variables	be	denoted	by	italics.	The	expectations	of	each	variable	are	taken	before	the	consumers	or	banks	are	instantiated.	Since	each	consumer	has	attributes	drawn	from	the	same	random	distributions,	all	consumers	are	expected	to	have	the	same	values	for	these	attributes.	Thus	subscripts	indicating	individual	expectations	will	be	removed	(e.g.	Yi	=	Yj	=	Y*	for	all	i	and	j).		 Stationarity	in	this	model	is	defined	as	keeping	the	system	wide	expected	levels	of	short	term	assets	and	long	term	assets	(and	therefore	total	assets)	for	the	consumers	and	banks	constant	over	time.	If	stationarity	is	imposed	at	the	system	wide	expected	levels	of	assets,	it	follows	that	the	same	must	be	true	for	individual	consumers	and	the	bank.			 Stationarity	is	important	because	it	eliminates	any	effects	of	growth	and	allows	the	examination	of	critical	points	in	meaningful	ways.	Without	stationarity,	the	inclusion	of	a	growth	trend	would	be	necessary.	This	would	significantly	complicate	any	expectations	in	the	model.	Without	stationarity	imposed,	the	system	would	constantly	be	in	flux.	While	this	is	in	of	itself	is	not	problematic,	the	purpose	of	the	PBLM	is	to	examine	critical	points	and	critical	behaviors.	If	a	system	is	constantly	in	flux,	the	question	of	what	is	meaningful	becomes	less	clear	as	a	baseline	for	stability	no	longer	exists.	It	is	possible	that	critical	points	may	be	identified	during	a	period	of	flux,	but	it	is	unclear	if	those	points	would	still	be	meaningful	during	other	periods	of	flux	or	stability.	Thus	stationarity	is	important	
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for	not	unnecessarily	complicating	the	model	and	allowing	decisive	results	to	be	found.	True	stationarity	does	not	exist	in	the	PBLM.	Although	consumers	and	banks	operate	under	the	belief	that	there	is	stationarity,	the	system	actually	experiences	a	decrease	in	wealth	each	period	due	to	the	negative	expected	value	of	a	bank	failure.	Solving	this	issue	would	require	calculating	the	probability	of	a	consumer	losing	all	of	his	or	her	money	in	a	bank	failure	in	a	stationary	system.	This	would	be	extremely	difficult	once	proximity	based	learning	is	accounted	for	since	learning	can	lead	to	consumers	panicking	and	panic	induces	more	panic.68	Further,	calibrating	the	system	for	stationarity	incorporates	the	expected	loss	due	to	a	bank	failure	which	must	be	calculated	in	a	stationary	system.	This	is	a	circular	issue	that	prevents	true	stationarity	from	being	imposed.69	There	is	also	the	added	complication	of	debt	forgiveness.	If	a	consumer	only	has	$100,000	but	needs	to	pay	off	a	debt	of	$120,000,	the	remaining	$20,000	is	essentially	written	off.70	But	this	is	not	accounted	for	in	the	standard	expectations	taken	in	the	PBLM.	Thus	the	expected	value	of	consumer	actions	should	actually	be	greater	since	full	losses	are	not	able	to	be	absorbed	by	the	system.	There	are	two	opposing	forces	on	stationarity	that	are	not	accounted	for	in	the	PBLM.	The	expected	loss	due	a	bank	failure	makes	the	system	tend	negative																																																									68	These	ideas	are	elaborated	on	in	the	Proximity	Based	Learning	Section.	Readers	may	want	to	read	that	section	before	coming	back	to	the	problems	with	stationarity	in	this	model.	69	“Revising	is	like	pooping.	You	need	to	get	it	all	out	there	first	and	then	pick	through	it	for	kernels	of	truth.”	–	Micah	Lau	(2012).	70	There	is	no	true	receiver	of	the	deficits	paid	by	consumers.	The	amounts	consumers	pay	out	are	simply	assumed	to	leave	the	system.		
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while	debt	forgiveness	makes	the	system	tend	positive.	It	is	absolutely	not	the	intention	of	this	study	to	assume	the	two	forces	cancel	each	other	out.71	Neither	issue	could	be	resolved	at	this	time.	Hence	all	results	from	this	project	should	be	taken	with	the	caveat	that	the	assumption	that	assets	are	stationary	may	or	may	not	be	true.72	The	stationarity	excluding	the	possibility	of	a	bank	failure	and	debt	forgiveness	is	as	close	to	true	stationarity	as	this	study	could	come.73,74		
Individual	Consumer75		 Applied	to	the	individual	consumer,	stationarity	means	the	consumer’s	expected	total	assets	do	not	change	over	time.	76	Since	before	instantiation	all	consumers	are	expected	to	have	the	same	attributes,	the	subscript	indicating	the																																																									71	Although	this	would	be	extremely	convenient.	72	The	problems	created	by	the	lack	of	stationarity	will	be	discussed	in	the	section	on	proximity	based	learning.	73	The	author	expects	this	issue	to	be	a	tree	with	depth	equal	to	the	number	of	consumers	in	the	model.	At	each	node,	a	consumer	learns.	Each	branch	stemming	from	the	node	indicates	the	various	“combinations”	of	consumers	the	consumer	might	see.	But	these	combinations	are	dependent	on	the	states	of	each	of	those	consumers.	For	example,	Consumer	A	might	have	been	shocked,	might	have	not	had	the	opportunity	to	learn,	might	have	panicked,	might	not	have	panicked,	etc.	The	order	in	which	the	consumers	learn	also	matters	so	that	would	further	multiply	the	already	immense	number	of	branches	from	each	node.	Taking	expectations	would	also	be	made	even	more	difficult	by	the	fact	that	the	panic	process	is	so	affected	by	heterogeneity	that	to	use	consistent	expectations	would	rob	the	model	of	the	learning	process	that	makes	it	so	unique.		74	The	issue	of	stationarity	in	the	DD	model	is	not	relevant.	In	the	DD,	there	is	just	one	cycle	after	which	all	agents	and	assets	disappear.	The	lack	of	continuity	means	agents	are	unconcerned	with	the	future.	However,	if	there	was	growth	over	time,	any	future	tipping	points	should	account	for	that	growth.		75	Let	β	=	βc	and	α	=	αc.	76	The	expected	levels	are	constant	at	the	same	points	in	the	period	across	periods.	I.e.	a	consumer’s	expected	level	of	short	term	assets	after	receiving	her	net	income	is	
St	+	It		for	all	t.	However,	the	consumer’s	expected	level	of	short	term	assets	before	receiving	her	net	income	is	St	for	all	t.	Timing	is	very	important	here.	
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specific	consumer	will	be	dropped.	Let	the	consumer’s	expected	current	total	level	of	assets	before	she	receives	her	net	income	in	period	t	be	represented	by	Kt.	Stationarity	implies	24.	 Kt		=	Ks	=	K*	for	all	periods	s	and	t	where	K*	is	the	total	value	of	the	consumer’s	initial	endowments	of	resources	 	 77	 	 	Stationarity	is	also	defined	here	to	mean	that	the	consumer’s	expected	levels	of	short	term	and	long	term	assets	are	constant.	Let	the	consumer’s	expected	face	value	amounts	of	short	term	and	long	term	assets	in	period	t	before	she	receives	her	net	income	be	St	and	Lt,	respectively.	Stationarity	implies		 25.	 St	=	Ss	=	S*	for	all	periods	s	and	t			 26.	 Lt	=	Ls	=	L*	for	all	periods	s	and	t	where	S*	and	L*	are	the	initial	endowments	of	short	term	and	long	term	assets	for	all	consumers.		 Consider	the	actions	the	consumer	undertakes	in	each	period.	She	initially	receives	her	net	income	which	has	an	expected	value	I*.	Since	consumer	assets	grow	over	time	at	positive	rates	βc	and	αc,	I*	must	be	negative	to	keep	the	expected	total	value	of	assets	constant	over	time.	Using	equation	5,	this	means		 I*	=	E[I]	=	Y*(1	–	γ*	–	λΨ)	<	0	which	implies	27.	 1	–	γ*	–	λΨ	<	0	In	the	section	on	net	income,	γ*,	λ,	and	Ψ	are	all	at	least	0	since	they	are	the	consumer’s	expected	average	consumption	rate,	probability	of	getting	shocked,	and	
																																																								77	Initial	resource	endowments	are	identical	for	all	consumers.	
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the	income	multiplier	of	the	shock.	Equation	27	yields	a	relationship	indicating	the	necessary	magnitudes	of	these	variables.		 Following	the	principles	outlined	in	the	Asset	Liquidation	section,	consumers	liquidate	all	short	term	assets	before	any	long	term	assets	due	to	the	real	cost	associated	with	early	liquidation.	Thus	the	consumer	expects	to	pay	a	deficit	of	|I*|	each	period.		Suppose	|I*|	≥	S*.	Then	she	is	expected	to	exhaust	her	entire	supply	of	short	term	assets	each	period.	This	is	unsustainable	as	this	means	she	is	expected	to	have	0	long	term	assets	in	the	next	period	following	the	asset	conversion	guidelines.	This	is	impossible	under	the	definition	of	stationarity	unless	her	initial	long	term	asset	endowment	is	0.	We	will	ignore	this	case	as	it	would	be	trivial.	Therefore	we	assume		28.	 |I*|	<	S*		 After	the	consumer	pays	off	her	deficit,	she	has	S*+	I*	in	short	term	assets	and	L*.	Following	the	asset	conversion	process,	this	means	in	period	t+1	before	she	receives	her	net	income	she	will	have	S*+	I*	in	long	term	assets	and	β(L*)	in	short	term	assets.	Since	we	have	been	using	expected	values	this	entire	time,	according	to	stationarity	of	short	term	assets,	equation	25	means	S*	=	β(L*)	29.	 L*	=	!∗! 	 	Equation	29	indicates	the	balance	between	the	initial	face	value	of	the	short	term	asset	endowment	and	initial	face	value	of	the	long	term	asset	endowment	for	all	consumers	under	the	assumption	of	stationarity.	This	is	a	key	calibrating	relationship	in	the	PBLM.	
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	 According	to	the	stationarity	of	long	term	assets,	equation	26	means		 	 S*+	I*	=	L*	 substituting	equation	29	into	this	yields		 	 S*+	I*	=	!∗! 	 which	simplifies	to		 30.	 β	=	 !∗!∗! !∗ 	Equation	30	indicates	that	the	long	term	return	rate	for	consumers	is	a	function	of	the	consumer’s	initial	short	term	endowment	and	expected	net	income.	This	is	another	key	calibrating	relationship	in	the	PBLM.		 Together,	equations	27,	28,	29,	and	30	provide	several	key	relationships	required	to	keep	consumer	assets	stationary	in	the	PBLM.	
Bank			 Nearly	all	of	the	steps	for	finding	the	relationship	that	keeps	the	bank	assets	stationary	parallel	that	for	the	consumer	assets.	Banks	are	endowed	with	no	assets	of	their	own.	Hence	their	starting	endowments	of	short	term	and	long	term	assets	are	equal	to	those	of	the	consumer.	Banks	are	also	subject	to	the	same	change	in	assets	due	to	the	net	incomes	of	consumers	that	consumers	are.	Thus	if	all	of	the	bank’s	“equations”	are	divided	by	the	initial	number	of	consumers,	the	steps	for	finding	stationarity	are	nearly	identical.	However,	banks	also	face	the	aforementioned	operating	cost	D.78	Let	the	operating	cost	per	consumer	by	d.79	Note	that	changes	in	bank	assets	due	to	returns	on	investments	are	in	terms	of	the	underlying	asset	returns,	not	the	consumer	asset	returns.80																																																										78	This	cost	is	only	incurred	after	the	initial	period	and	its	timing	is	crucial.	79	Assume	d	<	0.	80	i.e.	banks’	long	term	assets	are	converted	into	short	term	assets	at	βb	not	βc,	etc.	
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	 Consider	the	bank’s	expected	asset	levels	per	consumer	in	period	0.	Initially,	before	consumers	make	any	withdrawals,	the	bank	holds	S*	in	short	term	assets	and	
!∗!!	in	long	term	assets.	Notice	that	the	ratio	of	short	to	long	term	assets	is	in	terms	of	βc	not	βb.	Once	consumers	make	their	expected	withdrawals	each	of	I*,	the	bank	has	S*+	I*	in	short	term	assets	and	!∗!!	in	long	term	assets.	Following	the	asset	conversion	process,	in	period	1	the	bank	is	expected	to	have	per	capita	short	term	holdings	of	
!∗!! (𝛽!)	and	long	term	holdings	of	S*+	I*.	Immediately	after	the	asset	conversion	process,	the	operating	cost	is	imposed	on	the	bank.	We	will	assume	|d|	<	!∗!! (𝛽!)	such	that	the	bank	now	holds	!∗!! 𝛽! +  𝑑 > 0	in	short	term	assets.		 Since	we	are	still	using	expectations,	under	the	definition	of	the	stationarity	of	bank	assets,	we	have		 	 S*	=	!∗!! 𝛽! +  d	which	can	be	rewritten	as		 	 	 	 	31.	 𝛽! = (1−  !!∗)𝛽! 	 	 	 	 	 	 81	 	Equation	31	indicates	that	the	long	run	return	on	the	bank	asset	must	be	sufficiently	large	to	offset	the	operating	cost	imposed	on	banks.	Note	that	equation	30	equates	the	expectations	of	the	bank’s	long	term	assets	in	the	same	way	that	it	does	so	for	consumers.	Thus	equation	31	in	conjunction	with	the	previously	mentioned	calibrating	relationships	for	consumers	create	stationarity	among	bank	assets.82	
																																																								81	Since	d	<	0,	βb	>	βc	which	is	consistent	with	equation	11	in	the	section	on	the	consumer	asset.	82	The	reader	may	find	these	calibrating	relationships	interesting	since	neither	αc	nor	αb	are	anywhere	to	be	found.	How	is	it	possible	that	α	is	irrelevant	in	
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Proximity	Based	Learning			 Proximity	based	learning	is	at	the	core	of	how	the	PBLM	expands	upon	the	DD	model.	Proximity	based	learning	means	a	consumer	is	able	to	look	at	the	wealth	distributions	of	several	near	consumers	and	use	that	information	to	make	a	decision.	This	allows	the	actions	of	one	consumer	to	affect	the	decisions	of	any	other	consumers	that	observe	his	or	her	actions.	This	mechanism	will	be	used	to	transmit	panic	between	consumers	so	that	the	panic	process	can	actually	be	modeled.	A	panic	here	is	a	decision	by	a	consumer	to	withdraw	all	their	assets	from	the	bank	immediately	even	though	he	or	she	may	not	have	an	immediate	liquidity	need.	This	means	liquidating	short	term	assets	at	face	value	and	long	term	assets	at	αc	times	face	value	and	holding	cash	instead.			 Proximity	based	learning	is	the	process	by	which	a	consumer	can	observe	others	consumers,	see	the	consumers’	net	incomes	or	any	additional	withdrawal	the	consumers	chose	to	make,	and	whether	or	not	the	consumers	panicked	in	the	current	period.	83	For	example,	Consumer	A	might	observe	Consumer	B.	Consumer	A	
																																																																																																																																																																					determining	stationarity	in	the	system?	The	PBLM	is	only	stationary	excluding	the	expected	loss	due	to	a	bank	failure.	It	is	only	when	consumers	panic	and	banks	fail	that	any	agent	would	choose	to	liquidate	their	assets	early	and	actually	receive	a	return	of	α.	Since	consumers	and	banks	do	not	actively	expect	losses	due	to	a	bank	failure,	α	is	not	considered	in	any	calibrating	equations	that	are	necessary	for	“stationarity.”	However,	true	stationarity	would	almost	surely	include	both	αc	and	αb	as	those	are	expected	to	affect	how	likely	the	bank	is	to	fail.	83	Once	a	consumer	has	the	opportunity	to	do	proximity	based	learning,	the	consumer	may	choose	to	withdraw	his	or	her	entire	remaining	assets	from	the	bank	and	instead	hold	that	amount	as	cash.	Hence	a	consumer	that	may	have	had	positive	net	income	of	$400	but	later	panicked	and	withdrew	$3000	from	the	bank	would	be	
45	
could	see	that	Consumer	B	is	holding	$300	in	cash	and	has	not	yet	panicked	in	the	period.	If	Consumer	B	executes	his	proximity	based	learning	later84	and	then	decides	to	panic	and	withdraw	his	remaining	$2000	from	the	bank,	Consumer	A	is	unable	to	change	her	actions.	Each	consumer	only	learns	once	in	each	period	and	they	act	upon	the	information	they	receive	as	soon	as	they	receive	it.	Hence	consumers	have	no	ability	to	receive	updated	information	or	change	their	decisions	once	they	have	been	made.85		 In	the	DD	model	in	period	1,	if	consumer	liquidity	demands	(negative	net	incomes)	will	be	at	such	a	level	that	the	bank	will	fail,	“everyone	rushes	in	to	withdraw	their	deposits	before	the	bank	gives	out	all	of	its	assets.”86	In	the	sentence	above,	“if	consumer	withdrawals	will	be”	is	indicative	of	the	fact	that	every	consumer	is	able	to	see	the	liquidity	demands	of	every	other	consumer	before	consumers	actually	act	upon	any	desires	to	liquidate	assets	from	the	bank.	The	intuition	behind	proximity	based	learning	is	that	such	extensive	consumer	information	is	not	actually	readily	available	to	everyone.	It	seems	unrealistic	that	each	consumer	should	be	aware	of	every	other	account	holder	at	the	bank.	It	is	more	reasonable	to	expect	that	Consumer	A	may	be	aware	of	the	liquidity	needs	of	several	of	her	friends.	Based	off	of	this	limited	information,	Consumer	A	develops	beliefs	regarding	the	greater	consumer	population	to	make	a	decision.																																																																																																																																																																							seen	as	withdrawing	$3000	in	cash	after	his	turn	to	withdraw,	but	depositing	$400	before.	84	The	order	in	which	consumers	perform	proximity	based	learning	is	random.	85	This	is	consistent	with	the	idea	of	the	single	service	constraint.	Diamond	and	Dybvig	expand	on	this	and	say	“a	bank’s	payoff	to	any	agent	can	depend	only	on	the	agent’s	place	in	line	and	not	on	future	information	about	agents	behind	him	in	line.”	86	DD	(1983)	p.403.	
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	 The	bank	panic	process	in	the	DD	model	is	simultaneous	and	realized	by	all	consumers.	This	is	logical	in	the	presence	of	complete	knowledge	of	consumer	actions	and	the	bank’s	assets.	However,	using	the	proximity	based	learning	process,	this	study	allows	decisions	of	consumers	to	affect	the	decisions	of	other	consumers.	The	PBLM	lets	the	authors	include	an	actual	panic	transmission	process	where	if	Consumer	A	observes	Consumer	B	panic,	Consumer	A	is	more	likely	to	panic	because	she	saw	Consumer	B	panic.	This	panic	transmission	process	can	lead	to	a	“coordinated	panic”	like	in	the	DD	model,	but	this	is	the	organic	result	of	consumers	passing	on	information	as	opposed	to	a	byproduct	of	completely	visible	consumer	and	bank	information.		 The	information	a	consumer	receives	from	this	process	is	dependent	on	whom	the	consumer	observes	and	when	the	consumer	observes	them.	Whom	the	consumer	observes	is	based	on	actual	geographical	proximity	and	chance.	In	this	model,	each	consumer	looks	at	their	neighborhood	(think	of	a	square	at	which	the	consumer	is	in	the	middle)	and	randomly	picks	G	consumers	in	that	neighborhood	to	look	at.87	Although	geographical	proximity	is	used	here,	it	could	be	thought	of	as	social	familiarity.	Geographical	proximity	is	convenient	in	that	it	allows	information	to	spread	with	a	literal	domino	effect.	When	refers	to	the	timing	of	the	observation.	This	important	idea	merits	its	own	subsection	below.			 																																																									87	G	is	the	maximum	number	of	consumers	one	can	observe.	If	there	are	fewer	than	G	consumers	in	one’s	neighborhood,	the	consumer	looks	at	all	consumers	in	the	neighborhood.	
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Timing			 Timing	here	will	generally	refer	to	the	consumer’s	place	in	line	to	do	proximity	based	learning.88		Timing	is	very	important	in	the	learning	process	because	consumers	must	make	their	decision	immediately	after	they	learn	and	are	then	unable	to	take	any	other	actions.	This	was	highlighted	in	the	example	above	where	once	Consumer	A	chose	not	to	panic,	she	could	not	later	withdraw	any	money	from	the	bank	in	the	period.	Consumer	A	may	observe	Consumer	B	before	or	after	Consumer	B	has	the	opportunity	to	learn.	If	Consumer	B	has	not	already	learned,	then	Consumer	B	has	not	had	the	opportunity	to	withdraw	all	his	money	from	the	bank.	Also,	Consumer	A	does	not	have	the	opportunity	to	benefit	from	“informed”	actions	of	Consumer	B.			 The	above	paragraph	is	also	indicative	of	the	fact	that	the	liquidity	demands	on	the	system	are	dynamic.	If	Consumer	A	chooses	to	panic,	she	will	withdraw	all	of	her	assets	from	the	bank.	Her	panic	and	withdrawal	increase	the	liquidity	demand	in	the	system.	Thus	Consumer	A	is	able	to	impose	a	state	change	on	the	system	when	she	learns.	Liquidity	demands	can	never	drop	below	their	initial	level	as	the	initial	level	reflects	the	net	incomes	of	consumers	in	the	system.	Consumers	can	always	panic	and	withdraw	more	money	from	the	bank	beyond	their	net	income,	but	they	can	never	choose	to	deposit	more	money	into	the	bank	beyond	their	net	income.89,90	Since	consumers	panicking	can	increase	liquidity	demands	on	the	
																																																								88I.e.	the	first	consumer	to	learn	goes	“before”	or	“earlier”	than	the	last	consumer	in	line	to	learn.	89	This	comes	from	the	fact	that	consumers	have	no	other	external	sources	of	money	they	could	deposit.	
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system,	as	more	consumers	have	the	opportunity	to	learn,	it	becomes	more	likely	that	at	least	one	of	them	will	panic	and	increase	the	overall	liquidity	demand.	Thus	one	would	expect	for	the	final	(after	everyone	has	learned)	liquidity	demands	on	the	system	to	be	larger	than	the	initial	demands.	Given	that	consumers	are	unable	to	revise	any	past	decisions	or	make	decisions	based	on	future	information	from	consumers,	they	can	only	attempt	to	assess	the	current	state	of	the	system	when	it	is	their	turn	to	learn.	The	first	consumer	in	line	will	see	the	system	in	its	true	initial	state	whereas	the	50th	person	could	see	the	system	after	up	to	49	state	changes.	However,	when	the	two	consumers	learn,	they	are	actually	seeing	different	environments	due	to	the	timing.	Thus	they	are	making	decisions	based	off	of	the	environment	that	exists	around	them	when	they	make	their	decision.	Although	the	system	the	50th	consumer	sees	is	more	likely	to	be	closer	to	the	system’s	final	state,	his	actions	are	not	necessarily	more	correct	than	the	one’s	the	first	consumer	undertakes.	Each	consumer	must	be	judged	against	the	environment	they	are	in	when	they	have	the	opportunity	to	make	a	decision.	This	idea	will	become	clearer	in	the	results	section	when	the	accuracy	of	consumer	estimates	is	evaluated.91	It	would	be	unfair	to	evaluate	the	correctness	of	the	first	consumer’s	actions	against	the	final	system	state	when	that	was	not	the	
																																																																																																																																																																					90	Technically	if	a	consumer	panicked	and	withdrew	all	their	money	from	the	bank	in	the	previous	period,	they	would	have	more	money	than	just	their	net	income.	However,	the	extra	money	beyond	the	true	net	income	would	be	treated	as	net	income	in	the	accounting	of	the	system.	91	This	study	will	look	at	the	consumer’s	estimate	of	their	current	environment	compared	to	the	actual	state	of	the	environment	at	that	time	to	determine	“correctness.”	
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state	the	first	consumer	acted	in.	Timing	allows	us	look	at	whether	the	consumer	is	making	a	good	decision	at	that	point	in	time.	 		
Proximity	Based	Learning	Tipping	Point		 		 Consumers	use	the	liquidity	information	they	obtain	from	the	proximity	based	learning	process	to	gauge	overall	liquidity	demands	on	the	bank.	If	they	feel	liquidity	demands	are	larger	than	the	bank	can	meet,	they	panic.	The	balance	between	liquidity	demands	and	the	bank’s	assets	will	now	be	discussed.92		 Banks	in	the	PBLM	are	always	net	negative.	Consumers	initially	deposit	short	term	assets	which	the	bank	offers	back	to	them	at	face	value.	The	long	term	assets	consumers	initially	deposit	are	redeemable	to	the	consumer	at	αc	times	face	value	but	the	bank	can	only	liquidate	long	term	assets	at	αb	times	face	value	and	αb	<	αc.	Hence	the	bank’s	liabilities	are	greater	than	its	assets.	Under	the	stationarity	assumptions,	expected	consumer	assets	(or	the	bank’s	liabilities)	are	constant	and	expected	bank	assets	are	constant	so	the	bank	is	always	expected	to	have	a	negative	net	worth.	This	is	actually	not	problematic.	In	period	1	of	the	DD	model,	the	bank	is	also	net	negative.	In	fact,	any	liquidity	services	provided	by	the	bank	at	all	necessitates	that	the	bank	be	net	negative	at	least	sometimes	and	exposed	to	bank	runs.93		 Similar	to	the	DD	model,	the	bank	can	be	net	negative	and	consumers	are	not	necessarily	worried.	Consumers	need	only	be	worried	when	other	consumers																																																									92	Banks	use	their	short	term	and	long	term	assets	to	meet	obligations.	93	DD	(1983)	p.403.	
50	
withdraw	so	much	money	from	the	bank	that	the	bank	will	run	out	of	assets	to	meet	its	expected	obligations	in	the	next	period.94	Thus	the	bank	can	exist	in	a	net	negative	state	as	long	as	consumers	believe	the	bank	can	meet	its	expected	obligations.	What	follows	will	build	off	of	ideas	of	the	DD	and	PBLM	equilibria	discussed	in	the	Diamond	and	Dybvig	Equlibria	section.		 We	will	now	consider	the	bank’s	per	capita	level	of	assets.	In	the	first	period,	the	bank	has	S*	in	short	term	assets	and	L	in	long	term	assets.	The	consumer	has	expected	net	income	I	<	0	and	the	bank’s	operating	cost	per	consumer	is	d	<	0.	Suppose	the	consumer’s	actual	net	income	in	the	period	is		32.	 I1	=	-(S*	+	𝛼!(!! ! !!!!!! ))	<	0	 	 	 	 	 	 95	Then	the	consumer	withdraws	–I1	from	the	bank.96	The	bank	must	now	generate	–I1	in	value	by	liquidating	its	short	and	long	term	assets.	Following	the	liquidation	rules,	the	bank	initially	attempts	to	liquidate	–I1	using	it	short	term	assets.	However,	since			 33.	 I1>	S*	The	bank	liquidates	all	of	its	short	term	assets	but	must	still	service	the	remaining	𝛼!(!! ! !!!!!! ).	Since	the	bank	liquidates	its	long	term	assets	at	a	rate	of	αb	times	face	value,	it	must	liquidate	(!! ! !!!!!! )	in	face	value	of	long	term	assets	to	fully	meet	the	obligation.	The	bank	is	able	to	do	so	since	d,	I	<	0	and	=< 𝐿.	Thus	the	bank	will	have	
																																																								94	If	the	bank	is	unable	to	meet	its	expected	obligations	in	the	current	period,	it	surely	cannot	meet	obligations	in	the	next	period.	95	Assume	𝛽! 𝐿 + 𝑑 + 𝐼	>	0		96	Assume	that	the	consumer	has	the	assets	to	make	such	a	withdrawal.	
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L	-	(!! ! !!!!!! )	in	face	value	long	term	assets	and	no	short	term	assets	at	the	end	of	the	period.		 Following	the	asset	conversion	process	into	the	next	period,	the	bank’s	long	term	assets	are	converted	into	short	term	assets	at	a	rate	of	βb	times	face	value.	Thus	the	bank	will	now	have			 34.	 βb(L	-	(!! ! !!!!!! ))	=	βb(L)	-	βb(L)	–	d	–	I		=	-d	–	I		
	 	 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 =  −𝑑 − 𝐼	in	short	term	assets	and	no	long	term	assets.	The	bank	must	now	pay	its	per	capita	operating	cost	of	d.	It	attempts	to	do	that	out	of	its	short	term	assets	first	so	it	will	have	–d	–	I	+	d	=	-I	in	short	term	assets	remaining.	Now	the	consumer	will	receive	her	net	income	which	has	an	expected	value	of	I.	If	the	consumer’s	net	income	I2	was	actually	more	negative	than	expected	(i.e.	I2	<	I),	then	the	bank	would	not	be	able	to	meet	the	consumer’s	full	withdrawal.	If	the	bank	is	not	able	to	meet	the	consumer’s	full	withdrawal,	the	bank	fails	and	the	consumer	loses	the	difference.		 Thus	the	consumer’s	initial	withdrawal	I1	was	just	large	enough	that	the	bank	has	exactly	the	amount	it	needed	to	meet	its	expected	obligations	in	the	next	period.	Had	the	consumer	withdrawn	any	more	money,	the	bank	would	be	expected	to	fail	in	the	next	period.	So	equation	32	captures	the	tipping	point	for	the	average	withdrawal	per	consumer	relative	to	the	average	short	term	and	long	term	holdings	of	the	bank	per	consumer	before	the	bank	is	expected	to	fail.		 This	tipping	point	will	now	be	placed	in	the	context	of	the	whole	system.	Essentially,	if	total	withdrawals	are	so	high	that	they	decrease	the	bank’s	assets	in	
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the	next	period	below	the	bank’s	expected	obligations	in	the	next	period,	the	bank	is	expected	to	fail	in	the	next	period.	Hence	any	consumer	realizing	the	bank	is	beyond	this	tipping	point	will	panic	and	attempt	to	withdraw	all	their	assets	from	the	bank	in	the	current	period	to	avoid	losing	all	their	assets	in	the	bank	failure	in	the	next	period.	This	is	the	tipping	point	reached	when	the	sequential	service	constraint	and	other	ideas	from	the	Diamond	Dybvig	Equilibria	section	are	fully	applied	to	the	PBLM.		 There	are	two	panic	conditions	in	this	model	that	are	evaluated	against	this	tipping	point.	First,	consumers	will	panic	if	they	feel	other	consumers	are	withdrawing	such	a	large	amount	from	the	bank	that	the	bank	will	not	be	able	to	meet	its	expected	obligations	in	the	next	period.	This	is	considered	a	liquidity	panic.	Second,	consumers	will	also	panic	if	the	proportion	of	panicked	consumers	they	observe	is	so	large	that	they	think	the	bank	will	not	be	able	to	meet	its	expected	obligations	in	the	next	period.	This	is	considered	a	panic	panic.	Both	of	these	conditions	are	evaluated	using	ad	hoc	expectations.		
First	Condition			 Under	this	condition,	Consumer	A	is	worried	that	other	consumers	are	withdrawing	so	much	money	from	the	bank	that	the	bank	will	not	be	able	to	meet	its	expected	obligations	in	the	next	period.	This	section	describes	equation	32	evaluated	using	the	idea	of	proximity	based	learning.	Let	ζ	**	be	the	actual	average	withdrawal	amount	of	every	consumer	in	the	system	at	the	time	Consumer	A	is	learning.	Let	π**	be	the	actual	average	amount	of	short	term	assets	the	bank	holds	
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per	consumer	at	the	time	A	is	learning.	Let	ξ**	be	the	actual	average	amount	of	long	term	assets	the	bank	holds	per	consumer	at	the	time	A	is	learning.	To	gauge	the	overall	liquidity	demands	of	the	system,	Consumer	A	looks	at	either	the	cash	holdings	of	his	neighbors	or	their	initial	liquidity	demands.97	Consumer	A	uses	this	information	to	estimate	the	average	withdrawal	ζ	***	of	every	other	consumer	this	period.	35.	 ζ	***	=	! !"#! !" !"#$#%! !"#$"%"&' !"#$%!!"#$%& !" !"#$%&'($ 	𝐸𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 =  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑟!𝑠 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠		 36.	 E[ζ	***]	=	ζ	**	Consumer	A	then	estimates	how	much	the	bank	holds	in	short	term	assets	using	his	own	short	term	assets	as	the	average	amount	of	short	term	assets	held	by	every	other	consumer	in	the	system.	Consumer	A	uses	the	same	method	to	estimate	the	average	amount	of	long	term	assets	held	by	every	other	consumer.	So	if	the	consumer	holds	JA	in	short	term	assets	and	JL	in	long	term	assets,	he	estimates	the	average	short	term	assets	π***	and	long	term	assets	ξ***	such	that		37.	 π	***	=	JA	38.	 ξ	***	=	JL	Consumer	A	then	compares	the	estimated	withdrawals	to	the	estimated	bank	assets	the	bank	holds	according	to	equation	32.	If	the	estimated	withdrawals	are	large	enough	such	that	the	bank’s	expected	assets	in	the	future	cannot	meet	its	
																																																								97	If	a	consumer	is	shocked	or	panics,	they	will	hold	those	assets	as	cash.	However,	a	consumer	that	is	not	shocked	or	has	not	panicked	would	have	deposited	net	income	into	the	bank.	Thus	cash	holdings	increase	the	average	withdrawal	amount	whereas	the	initial	liquidity	demand	decreases	if	the	consumer	holds	no	cash.	
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expected	obligations,	Consumer	A	will	panic	and	withdraw	all	her	money	from	the	bank.	This	condition	focuses	on	Consumer	A’s	perception	of	pure	liquidity	strains	based	on	estimations	of	the	bank’s	short	term	assets	according	to	equation	32.			 Consumer	A	does	not	have	true	rational	expectations	of	consumer	withdrawals	or	the	bank’s	assets.	Consumers	could	have	perfect	rational	expectations	given	that	all	variables	in	the	model	come	from	known	distributions	and	all	parameters	are	known.	However,	calculating	these	rational	expectations	would	be	extremely	difficult	and	not	a	realistic	behavior	in	practice.98	Instead	Consumer	A	uses	ad-hoc	expectations	based	on	the	information	available	to	him	when	he	makes	his	decision.	These	ad-hoc	expectations	are	not	entirely	rational	as	they	are	instead	based	on	actual	information	available	to	the	consumer.	Consumer	A	forms	beliefs	regarding	the	state	of	the	system	based	on	the	information	learned	and	acts	accordingly.	The	use	of	ad-hoc	expectations	is	deemed	to	be	more	appropriate	for	the	PBLM	as	it	attempts	to	remove	ideas	like	complete	visibility	into	consumer	actions	and	see	how	panics	can	develop	with	limited	information.	The	“estimations”	used	here	are	reflective	of	the	decisions	that	are	based	on	ad-hoc	expectations	as	opposed	to	perfect	rational	expectations.		 	
																																																								98	Lovell(1986)	reviewed	a	number	of	empirical	studies	looking	at	the	validity	of	rational	expectations.	He	found	that	although	a	number	of	the	models	were	based	on	sound	micro	foundations,	empirical	evidence	suggested	that	the	rational	expectations	hypothesis	should	be	rejected.		
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Second	Condition			 Under	this	condition,	Consumer	A	is	worried	that	such	a	large	proportion	of	consumers	are	panicking	that	the	bank	will	not	be	able	to	meet	its	expected	obligations	in	the	next	period.	To	gauge	this,	Consumer	A	looks	at	his	neighbors	and	observes	what	proportion	of	them	have	panicked.	Let	the	observed	proportion	be	θ***	such	that			 39.	 θ***	=	 !"#$%& !" !"#$%&$' !"#$%&!"#$%& !" !"#$%&'($ !"#$%&$'		Consumer	A	uses	this	information	to	estimate	θ***	of	all	consumers	will	panic	this	period.		Consumer	A	then	estimates	how	much	each	panicking	consumer	will	withdraw,	Ω,	from	the	bank	using	his	own	levels	of	short	term	assets,	Jshort,	and	long	term	assets,	Jlong.99	Thus	following	the	rules	for	asset	liquidations,		 40.	 Ω	=	Jshort	+	αc(Jlong)	So	the	expected	withdrawal	unconditional	whether	the	consumer	panicked	is	θ***	times	Ω.	Consumer	A	then	estimates	how	much	the	bank	holds	in	short	term	assets	using	his	own	short	term	assets	as	the	average	amount	of	short	term	assets	held	by	every	other	consumer	in	the	system	and	the	same	for	his	long	term	assets.	So	if	the	consumer	holds	JA	in	short	term	assets	and	JL	in	long	term	assets,	he	estimates	the	average	short	term	assets	π***	and	long	term	assets	ξ***	such	that		41.	 π	***	=	JA	42.	 ξ	***	=	JL																																																									99	Alternatively,	Consumer	A	could	look	at	the	average	cash	holdings	of	each	panicked	consumer	to	determine	Ω.	
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Consumer	A	then	compares	his	estimated	average	“panic	withdrawals,”	θ***	(Ω),	to	his	estimation	of	the	bank’s	assets,	ξ	***	and	π	***.	This	comparison	is	made	using	the	tipping	point	equation	32.		 This	condition	focuses	on	Consumer	A’s	perceived	liquidity	strains	based	on	estimations	of	the	bank’s	assets	caused	by	individuals	panicking.	The	economic	intuition	and	use	of	ad-hoc	expectations	here	is	similar	to	that	for	the	first	condition	which	focused	purely	on	liquidity	strains.	Although	this	condition	ultimately	comes	down	to	perceived	liquidity	strains	too,	the	perceived	strains	stem	from	the	proportion	of	people	panicking.		Under	condition	2,	the	reader	can	see	how	a	consumer	panicking	directly	induces	other	consumers	to	panic.	This	captures	the	transmission	of	panics	directly.	It	makes	sense	to	have	a	panic	condition	where	panic	creates	itself.	Imagine	someone	screaming	as	they	witness	a	murder	in	the	subway.	Other	passersby	do	not	need	to	personally	witness	the	murder	to	feel	frightened	so	long	as	they	receive	strong	enough	signals	from	their	neighbors.		
Panic	Creates	More	Panic			 The	way	the	two	conditions	are	set	up,	Consumer	A	panicking	makes	other	consumers	more	likely	to	panic	in	two	ways.	When	Consumer	A	panics,	she	withdraws	all	of	her	assets	from	the	bank.	This	increases	the	amount	of	cash	she	holds.	Since	cash	holdings	are	what	consumers	use	to	gauge	the	liquidity	strains	other	consumers	are	putting	on	the	bank,	this	makes	other	consumers	more	likely	to	panic	under	the	first	condition.	Thus	panic	directly	leads	to	more	panic	in	the	first	
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condition.	The	second	condition	describes	how	Consumer	A’s	panic	directly	increases	the	estimated	average	panic	withdrawals	which	increases	the	likelihood	of	other	consumers	panicking.			 It	is	interesting	to	note	that	the	second	condition	cannot	occur	until	the	first	condition	occurs.	The	second	condition	looks	at	whether	or	not	Consumer	A	should	panic	based	on	the	panic	behavior	of	her	neighbors.	If	there	are	no	panics,	there	can	be	no	panic	panic.	However,	high	levels	of	normal	withdrawals	could	cause	Consumer	A	to	panic	under	the	first	condition	regardless	of	anybody	else’s	panic	behavior.	This	has	the	interesting	effect	where	consumers	that	learn	early	in	the	process	may	be	more	likely	to	panic	under	the	more	measured	first	condition	whereas	once	panics	occur,	the	likelihood	of	panicking	due	to	the	second	condition	increases.	Either	way,	since	panic	leads	to	more	panic,	consumers	that	learn	later	are	expected	to	be	more	likely	to	panic	than	early	consumers.	Ironically,	the	consumers	that	learn	last	are	the	ones	most	likely	to	lose	all	their	money	in	a	bank	failure	and	the	ones	most	likely	to	panic.			
Distortion	Potential	In	Estimating	Bank	Assets		 Consumers	only	look	at	their	own	levels	of	short	and	long	term	assets	to	estimate	the	bank’s	assets.	This	can	be	problematic	if	a	consumer	is	shocked.	When	the	consumer	is	shocked,	he	or	she	must	withdraw	a	significant	portion	of	their	assets	in	order	to	pay	off	the	deficit.	Thus	the	consumer	would	have	a	very	low	estimate	of	the	bank’s	assets.	Getting	shocked	greatly	distorts	one’s	estimation	of	the	bank’s	asset	and	therefore	increases	one’s	likelihood	of	panicking.	This	is	not	an	
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unreasonable	result	especially	if	one	considers	the	shock	to	be	a	period	of	high	stress	and	humans	tend	to	perform	poorly	under	stress.	Further,	if	systemic	shocks	are	incorporated	either	directly	into	the	PBLM	or	into	consumer	behavior,	such	a	distortion	may	be	desirable.	As	the	PBLM	currently	stands,	this	estimation	process	is	prone	to	distortions.	More	research	and	expansion	of	the	model	need	to	be	conducted	to	determine	whether	or	not	this	should	be	the	case.	A	possible	alternative	would	be	to	allow	consumers	to	expand	the	information	they	receive	through	learning	to	include	the	asset	levels	of	other	consumers.	Essentially,	consumers	currently	estimate	bank	assets	using	a	sample	size	of	1	(their	own	assets).	Expanding	that	sample	size	through	proximity	based	learning	would	likely	have	a	similar	effect	to	that	of	group	size	on	the	asset	estimation	differential.	However,	this	would	mean	consumers	are	now	essentially	sharing	their	exact	levels	of	personal	wealth	their	neighbors.	This	seems	to	be	a	stretch	in	terms	of	what	information	should	be	available	to	consumers.	Nevertheless,	this	approach	is	one	that	should	be	explored	in	the	future.	Another	interesting	alternative	would	be	implementing	a	weighted	average	of	a	consumer’s	past	asset	levels	such	that	the	impact	of	a	shock	could	be	smoothed.	This	could	have	the	same	impact	of	increasing	the	sample	size	but	still	keeping	consumers	constrained	by	the	knowledge	of	only	their	own	asset	levels.	Other	alternatives	should	at	least	be	considered	due	to	the	potential	for	shock	distortion	in	the	current	estimation	process.				 	
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Stationarity	Problem		 Stationarity	is	a	problem	in	the	PBLM	because	growth	is	not	explicitly	accounted	for	in	the	panic	conditions.	While	the	bank’s	assets	and	consumer	assets	likely	both	grow	in	the	same	direction,	it	is	very	possible	they	grow	at	different	magnitudes.	This	is	problematic	because	consumers	believe	they	constitute	a	per	capita	share	of	the	bank’s	assets.100	If	growth	rates	cause	each	consumer	to	no	longer	hold	a	per	capita	share	of	the	bank’s	assets,	the	consumer	cannot	easily	estimate	the	bank’s	assets.	Since	the	decision	to	panic	ultimately	comes	down	to	the	whether	the	consumer’s	estimated	bank	assets	are	large	enough	to	sustain	estimated	liquidity	demands	and	expected	obligations	in	the	next	period,	any	errors	in	the	consumer’s	estimate	of	the	bank’s	assets	affect	the	decision	to	panic.		Any	growth	in	assets	should	be	accounted	for	so	that	the	consumer	can	make	a	panic	decision	based	on	an	accurate	baseline	relationship	between	the	bank’s	assets	and	consumes’	assets.	An	alternative	approach	could	have	been	taken	where	the	PBLM	looks	at	just	one	cycle	like	the	DD	model.	In	that	case,	the	PBLM	would	still	be	an	interesting	extension	of	the	DD	model	as	the	PBLM	could	follow	the	same	rules	but	incorporate	learning	as	a	panic	transmission	process.	Stationarity	would	not	be	an	issue	with	just	one	cycle	as	there	would	be	no	reason	to	consider	future	growth.	In	a	one	cycle	model	under	the	DD	rules,	during	the	learning	process,	type	1	consumers	would	liquidate	their	entire	endowment	of	assets	(which	would	be	constant	across	all																																																									100	Per	capita	share	is	used	to	indicate	that	if	there	are	80	consumers	in	the	system,	the	expected	assets	of	a	consumer	should	be	equal	to	1/80	of	the	bank’s	actual	assets.	
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consumers).	Type	2	consumers	would	look	at	the	proportion	of	type	1	consumers	around	them	during	the	learning	process	and	attempt	to	estimate	the	true	proportion	of	type	1	consumers	in	the	system.	As	discussed	in	the	Diamond	and	Dybvig	Equilibria	section,	this	proportion	of	type	1	consumers	would	be	the	basis	for	whether	or	not	a	panic	occurs	under	given	banking	contracts.	Thus	panic	transmissions	could	be	observed	in	meaningful	ways	by	incorporating	proximity	based	learning	into	the	DD	framework.	Unfortunately,	the	problem	with	stationarity	was	realized	too	late	in	the	process	to	make	the	change	to	a	single	cycle	model.	As	it	stands,	the	current	PBLM	lays	the	foundation	for	a	future	model	with	true	risk	aversion	and	optimization	that	is	able	to	incorporate	multiple	cycles.		
Unnecessary	Panics		 Due	to	the	fact	that	consumers	receive	limited	information	that	may	or	may	not	be	representative	of	the	actual	state	of	the	system,	there	exist	“unnecessary	panics.”	These	are	panics	that	occur	due	to	incorrect	beliefs	consumers	develop	through	the	learning	process.	For	example,	had	the	consumer	been	fully	aware	of	all	consumers’	liquidity	needs	and	the	bank	assets,	the	consumer	would	not	panic.	However,	the	consumer	might	observe	a	group	of	consumers	with	particularly	high	liquidity	demands	which	cause	the	consumer	to	overestimate	the	actual	liquidity	demands	and	unnecessarily	panic.	But	as	more	consumers	begin	to	panic	and	increase	the	liquidity	demands	on	the	bank,	it	is	possible	that	a	bank	that	should	not	have	failed	due	to	initial	liquidity	demands	could	end	up	failing	as	demands	become	too	large	when	more	consumers	learn	and	panic.	
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If	there	were	complete	awareness	of	information	on	all	consumers	and	the	bank,	any	time	the	bank	is	in	a	failure	position,	each	consumer	would	know.	This	is	the	case	in	the	DD	model.	Thus	any	panic	(caused	by	large	initial	liquidity	demands)	under	the	DD	model	would	always	happen	in	the	PBLM	as	there	is	no	way	to	avoid	the	initial	liquidity	strains	on	the	bank.101	But	the	learning	process	allows	for	a	bank	failure	to	develop	before	this	point	given	that	consumers	may	incorrectly	panic	and	consequently	cause	an	actual	large	scale	panic	and	failure	situation.	The	learning	process	can	be	thought	of	as	a	replacement	for	the	sunspots	that	may	cause	bank	failures.102		
Proximity	Based	Learning	Summary		 The	idea	of	proximity	based	learning	stems	from	the	fact	that	consumers	want	to	make	informed	decisions.	However,	the	PBLM	generally	assumes	that	consumers	do	not	have	access	to	all	the	information	they	could	use	(i.e.	overall	liquidity	demands,	panic	proportions,	and	the	bank’s	levels	of	assets).	Through	the	learning	process,	consumers	are	able	to	derive	some	of	this	information	from	small	samples.	Consumers	may	sample	a	group	of	10	consumers	to	identify	their	average	liquidity	demands.	The	consumer	then	assumes	that	that	sample	was	representative	and	that	that	average	is	a	good	estimate	for	the	overall	liquidity	demands	in	the	system.	This	of	course	exposes	consumers	to	drawing	incorrect	conclusions	due	to	
																																																								101	Note	that	equation	15	which	captures	the	“DD”	tipping	point	if	it	were	translated	into	the	PBLM	is	not	the	same	as	equation	32	which	is	the	PBLM	tipping	point.	But	they	are	the	same	in	spirit.	102	DD	(1983)	p.410.	
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non-representative	samples.	But	this	is	more	and	better	information	than	solely	using	one’s	own	information.	The	presence	of	this	learning	is	very	different	than	the	simultaneous	and	complete	distribution	of	information	in	the	DD	model.	In	the	DD	model,	as	soon	as	any	proportion	of	consumers	would	attempt	to	withdraw	any	amount	of	assets	from	the	bank	such	that	the	bank	would	fail,	all	consumers	are	instantly	aware	of	this	fact	so	they	all	try	to	withdraw	their	entire	assets	from	the	bank	before	it	fails.	An	example	of	this	is	given	in	the	section	on	Diamond-Dybvig	equilibria.	All	consumers	essentially	have	access	to	information	on	all	other	consumers	and	the	bank,	hence	no	one	is	caught	unaware	should	a	bank	run	occur.	Bank	runs	or	bank	panics	and	bank	failures	are	synonymous	in	the	DD	model.	Consumers	in	the	PBLM	have	localized	information	as	opposed	to	full	information.	But	consumers	can	pass	information	to	each	other	via	the	learning	process.	Thus	the	learning	process	in	the	PBLM	allows	for	the	transmission	of	panics	to	be	modeled.	As	discussed	earlier	in	the	section,	one	consumer	panicking	makes	each	consumer	that	has	yet	to	learn	more	likely	to	panic.	This	is	effectively	communicating	panic	from	one	consumer	to	others.	With	this	process,	readers	can	directly	see	how	individuals	panicking	can	cascade	into	herd	like	behavior	and	eventually	cause	a	bank	failure.	However,	the	cascading	effect	is	not	simultaneous	like	it	is	in	the	DD	model.	The	proximity	based	learning	process	allows	information	to	disseminate	through	the	population	in	a	social	network	fashion.		 	
63	
Results	
Place	In	Line	(Timing)			 Please	first	read	the	subsection	on	Timing	in	the	Proximity	Based	Learning	Section.	A	consumer’s	place	in	line	indicates	when	they	are	able	to	learn.			 Results	were	obtained	using	the	following	scenario	in	Table	1	below.		
Table	1:	Parameters	for	Place	In	Line	
Consumer	Shock	Probability	 0.5	
Consumer	Short	Term	
Endowment	 100000	
Consumer	Long	Term	
Endowment	 57500	
Consumer	Gross	Income	 50000	
Consumer	Net	Income	 -42500	
Consumer	Short	Term	Payout	 1.18876	
Consumer	Long	Term	Payout	 1.73913	
Consumer	Mean	Rate	of	
Consumption	 0.85	
Consumer	Shock	Multiplier	 2	
Consumer	Population	 100	
All	Consumers	Visible	 FALSE	
Bank	Long	Term	Asset	Return	 1.826087	
Bank	Short	Term	Asset	Return	 1	
Bank	Count	 1	
Bank	Operating	Cost	 500000	
Consumer	Group	Size	 10	
Bank	Assets	Not	Visible	 TRUE		The	scenario	was	executed	200	times	using	Repast	Simphony	with	Java.103			 		 	
																																																								103	The	scenario	was	only	executed	200	times	due	to	issues	with	the	simulation	software.	
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As	discussed	in	the	Timing	subsection	in	the	Proximity	Based	Learning	Section,	the	state	of	the	system	is	dynamic	with	respect	to	consumers’	ability	to	learn	and	panic.	Consumers	can	only	panic	when	they	learn,	not	before	or	after.	Further,	the	way	panic	conditions	are	structured	in	the	PBLM,	panic	is	expected	to	lead	to	more	panic	under	both	the	liquidity	panic	condition	and	panic	panic	condition.	From	a	system	wide	standpoint,	when	the	first	consumer	learns,	no	consumers	will	have	had	the	opportunity	to	panic.	Hence	there	can	be	at	most	0	panicked	consumers	out	of	the	entire	population	before	he	learns.	When	the	last	consumer	learns,	every	other	consumer	has	had	the	opportunity	to	panic.	Thus	assuming	the	probability	of	panicking	is	nonzero,	the	proportion	of	panics	(total	number	of	panicked	consumers	divided	by	consumer	population	size)	is	expected	to	be	larger	later	in	the	system	than	it	is	earlier.	Since	panic	is	expected	to	increase	the	likelihood	of	others	panicking,	this	should	translate	into	consumers	that	learn	last	are	more	likely	to	panic	than	consumers	that	learn	first.	Essentially,	the	later	a	consumer	learns,	the	greater	probability	of	the	consumer	panicking.	Data	regarding	the	proportion	of	periods	each	consumer	panicked	by	place	in	line	is	shown	below.								
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Figure	2:	Proportion	of	Panics	vs.	Place	In	Line	
	The	above	data	reflect	that	the	proportion	of	times	a	consumer	panicked	(indicated	by	the	blue	diamond	labeled	“Panic”)	does	in	fact	increase	as	place	in	line	increases.	Thus	the	data	reflect	that	panic	does	create	panic	as	expected	from	the	theoretical	model.	This	result	indicates	that	there	is	an	effective	panic	transmission	process	created	by	proximity	based	learning.	Proximity	based	learning	is	a	viable	method	of	understanding	how	bank	failures	can	organically	develop	through	panic	transmission	as	opposed	to	using	levels	of	information	that	lead	to	completely	coordinated	panics	like	the	DD	model	uses.		
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Data	regarding	the	two	different	panic	conditions	is	also	displayed	in	the	graph.	The	probability	of	panicking	regardless	of	condition	is	nearly	identical	to	the	probability	of	panicking	under	the	liquidity	condition.	This	result	was	somewhat	surprising	as	the	author	had	hypothesized	the	panic	panic	condition	would	become	more	“effective”	as	the	number	of	panics	in	the	system	increased.	But	it	appears	the	reaction	to	liquidity	concerns	is	stronger	than	the	reaction	to	panic	based	liquidity	concerns	as	the	two	panic	conditions	are	defined	in	the	PBLM.	As	a	result,	in	the	following	analysis	the	separation	of	the	two	panic	conditions	will	be	dropped	and	we	will	only	be	interested	in	the	proportion	of	any	type	of	panic.	When	consumers	learn,	the	expectation	is	that	the	information	they	obtain	from	a	limited	sample	size	is	reflective	of	the	overall	state	of	the	system.	Thus	the	proportion	of	panicked	consumers	each	consumer	sees	when	they	learn	should	approximate	the	actual	proportion	of	panicked	consumers	in	that	system	state.	These	data	are	presented	below	according	to	the	consumer’s	place	in	line.	
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Figure	3:	Proportion	of	Panicked	Consumers	Observed	vs.	Place	In	Line	
		 These	data	clearly	indicate	the	expected	relationship	between	the	consumer’s	place	in	line	and	the	proportion	of	panicked	consumers	observed.	Since	the	latter	is	a	proxy	for	the	actual	proportion	of	panicked	consumers	in	the	system,	we	can	see	that	consumers’	perceptions	of	the	system	change	over	time	(referring	to	place	in	line)	in	a	way	that	matches	the	expected	actual	changes	in	the	system	state	(based	on	the	results	in	Figure	2).	Thus	proximity	based	learning	is	an	effective	way	for	consumers	to	perceive	the	state	of	the	system	even	as	the	system	changes.	This	is	an	important	result	because	it	means	information	is	disseminating	through	the	system	in	a	manner	much	more	organic	than	assuming	all	consumers	are	aware	of	all	pertinent	information	(consumer	liquidity	demands	and	bank	assets)	like	the	DD	model	does.	Further,	this	allows	for	the	transmission	of	panics	to	be	modeled	as	
0	0.05	
0.1	0.15	
0.2	0.25	
0.3	0.35	
0.4	
0	 20	 40	 60	 80	 100	 120	
Proportion	of	Panicked	Consumers	
Observed	vs.	Place	In	Line	
68	
opposed	to	only	having	a	single	bank	run	equilibrium	where	all	consumers	panic	at	the	same	time.		 	The	data	collected	regarding	how	consumer	responses	change	as	the	system	changes	indicates	that	proximity	based	learning	is	an	effective	method	of	panic	transmission.	The	PBLM	provides	a	framework	for	observing	how	individual	responses	of	consumers	to	localized	information	can	cascade	into	a	bank	failure.	This	is	a	new	addition	to	the	literature	that	future	researchers	can	use	to	actually	explore	how	panics	might	spread	in	more	realistic	situations	when	it	may	be	incorrect	to	assume	information	is	so	widely	available	that	either	all	consumers	panic	or	none	do	like	in	the	DD	model.	
	
Changing	Magnitude	of	Net	Income		 		 As	described	in	the	stationarity	section,	the	expected	value	of	net	income	I	is	negative.	Increasing	the	magnitude	of	net	income	here	refers	to	consumers	consuming	a	larger	portion	of	their	gross	income	in	each	period.	Recall	that		 43.	 I	=	E[I]	=	Y*(1	–	γ*	–	λΨ)	<	0	which	implies			 44.	 1	–	γ*	–	λΨ	<	0	since	Y*,	γ*,	λ,	and	Ψ	are	all	at	least	0	since	they	are	respectively	the	consumer’s	expected	gross	income,	expected	average	consumption	rate,	probability	of	getting	shocked,	and	the	income	multiplier	of	the	shock.	Increasing	the	magnitude	of	net	income	was	achieved	by	increasing	the	probability	of	consumers	suffering	an	idiosyncratic	shock,	λ.	
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	 Results	were	obtained	using	the	following	scenarios	in	Table	2	below.	Parameters	were	kept	as	constant	as	possible	under	the	stationarity	conditions	in	order	to	isolate	the	effect	of	changing	the	magnitude	of	net	income.	Consumer	Long	Term	Payout	was	calculated	following	βc	=	 !∗!∗! ! 	where	S*	was	held	constant	at	$100,000	and	I	was	changed	from	-$82500,	-$62500,	-$32500,	and	-$12500.	Bank	Long	Term	Asset	Return	is	equal	to	Consumer	Long	Term	Payout	multiplied	by	1.05.	The	ratio	between	the	two	long	term	returns	is	constant	as	is	the	short	term	endowment	such	that	the	bank’s	operating	cost	is	constant	in	each	scenario.	
Table	4:	Parameters	for	Changing	Net	Income	Magnitude	
	
Consumer	Expected	Net	Income	
	
-82500	 -62500	 -32500	 -12500	
Consumer	Shock	Probability	 0.9	 0.7	 0.4	 0.2	
Consumer	Short	Term	Endowment	 100000	 100000	 100000	 100000	
Consumer	Long	Term	Endowment	 17499.98688	 37499.95313	 67500.0675	 88945.33953	
Consumer	Gross	Income	 50000	 50000	 50000	 50000	
Consumer	Short	Term	Payout	 1	 1	 1	 1	
Consumer	Long	Term	Payout	 5.71429	 2.66667	 1.48148	 1.124286	
Consumer	Mean	Rate	of	
Consumption	 0.85	 0.85	 0.85	 0.85	
Consumer	Shock	Multiplier	 2	 2	 2	 2	
Consumer	Population	 100	 100	 100	 100	
Consumer	Group	Size	 25	 25	 25	 25	
All	Consumers	Visible	 FALSE	 FALSE	 FALSE	 FALSE	
Bank	Assets	Visible	 FALSE	 FALSE	 FALSE	 FALSE	
Bank	Long	Term	Asset	Return	 6	 2.8	 1.55555	 1.2	
Bank	Short	Term	Asset	Return	 1	 1	 1	 1	
Bank	Count	 1	 1	 1	 1	
Bank	Operating	Cost	 500000	 500000	 500000	 500000		
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	 Each	scenario	was	executed	500	times	using	Repast	Simphony	with	Java.	The	results	are	shown	below.104	
Table	5:	Proportion	of	Panics	vs.	Net	Income	
	
Proportion	of	Panics	
Net	Income		
-$82500	 0.366672901	
Net	Income	
-$62500	 0.332824339	
Net	Income	
-$32500	 0.187701131	
Net	Income	
-$12500	 0.041617774		
Figure	6:	Proportion	of	Panics	vs.	Net	Income	
		 	
																																																								104	An	alternative	set	of	parameters	was	initially	used,	but	it	did	not	yield	the	expected	simulation	results.	This	is	due	to	the	fact	that	the	previous	scenario	did	not	create	much	probability	for	a	panic.	Given	that	the	sample	size	of	500	is	relatively	small,	the	differences	resulting	from	changing	the	magnitude	of	net	income	could	not	be	realized.	A	decision	was	made	after	the	fact	to	use	a	more	volatile	scenario	that	would	clearly	allow	for	significant	differences	even	in	a	small	sample	size.	
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	 Proportion	of	panics	refers	to	the	average	proportion	of	consumers	that	panicked	for	any	reason	in	a	period.	The	results	clearly	indicate	that	as	the	magnitude	of	net	income	increases,	the	proportion	of	panics	also	increases.	This	result	is	not	surprising	as	the	decision	to	panic	is	based	on	whether	consumers	believe	the	bank	will	be	able	to	meet	its	expected	obligations	in	the	next	period.	Expected	obligations	are	the	bank’s	operating	cost	and	the	expected	withdrawals.	Thus	as	the	magnitude	of	net	income	increases,	the	expected	withdrawals	increase.	Recall	the	tipping	point	equation	32	for	the	average	withdrawal	per	customer.		 45.	 S*	+	𝛼!(!! ! !!!!!! )	Since	I	<	0,	as	the	magnitude	of	net	income	increases,	the	average	withdrawal	such	that	the	bank	will	not	be	able	to	meet	its	expected	obligations	in	the	next	period	decreases.	Thus	the	tipping	point	average	withdrawal	becomes	increasingly	closer	to	the	expected	withdrawal	as	the	magnitude	of	net	income	rises.	In	a	probabilistic	sense,	the	critical	point	moves	closer	to	the	mean	of	the	distribution	so	the	critical	point	is	more	likely	to	occur.	When	the	critical	point	occurs,	consumers	panic.	The	results	indicate	the	positive	relationship	between	the	magnitude	of	net	income	and	the	proportion	of	panic	expected	from	the	underlying	theoretical	model.			 Readers	may	also	be	interested	in	the	probability	of	the	bank	actually	failing	as	the	magnitude	of	net	income	rises.	Those	results	are	given	below.	
Table	7:	Proportion	of	Bank	Failures	vs.	Net	Income	
	
Proportion	of	Bank	Failures	
Net	Income	=	-$82500	 0.002588438	
Net	Income	=	-$62500	 0	
Net	Income	=	-$32500	 0	
Net	Income	=	-$12500	 0	
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	 		 Even	with	relatively	high	magnitudes	of	net	income,	the	probability	of	a	bank	failure	is	still	quite	small.	The	tipping	point	for	the	average	withdrawal	is	still	so	much	greater	than	the	expected	withdrawal	that	a	bank	failure	is	extremely	unlikely.	This	is	due	in	part	to	the	fact	that	tipping	point	for	the	bank	to	actually	fail	is	based	on	the	entire	consumer	population.	In	these	simulations,	that	value	was	100	consumers.	However,	when	consumers	made	their	personal	panic	decisions,	they	were	basing	those	decisions	on	observations	of	at	most	25	consumers.105	Following	the	Central	Limit	Theorem,	it	is	unsurprising	that	individual	consumers	are	more	likely	to	perceive	a	failure	than	the	actual	system	is	to	experience	one.	Additionally,	while	consumers’	bank	asset	estimations	are	subject	distortions	when	consumers	are	shocked,	the	bank’s	actual	assets	are	not	affected	nearly	as	significantly	by	shocks.			 The	general	results	here	stem	from	the	fact	that	when	the	magnitude	of	net	income	increases,	the	ability	of	the	capital	endowment	to	sustain	any	temporary	increases	in	consumption	is	diminished.	This	is	evidenced	by	the	analysis	of	the	tipping	point	in	the	section.	Thus	relatively	low	capital	environments	are	more	vulnerable	to	bank	failures	than	high	capital	environments.106	While	this	result	is	not	surprising,	it	indicates	that	low-capital	environments	could	require	benefit	from	using	greater	oversight	to	create	a	more	stable	banking	system.	Avoiding	these	additional	regulations	could	be	thought	of	as	some	of	the	benefits	present	in																																																									105	Consumers	look	at	the	lesser	of	the	number	of	consumers	in	neighborhood	and	the	learning	group	size.	106	Low	and	high	here	are	indicative	of	the	relationship	between	the	magnitude	of	net	income	and	asset	endowment.	
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wealthier	environments	due	to	the	fact	that	they	already	have	large	levels	of	capital.	This	interpretation	is	consistent	with	Honohan	(2000)	who	found	that	capital	requirements	in	industrial	countries	were	not	stringent	enough	for	most	developing	countries	due	to	differences	in	economy	size.	He	concluded	that	“strengthening	the	hand	of	national	bank	regulators”	in	developing	countries	was	the	best	way	to	reduce	the	“fragility	of	[weaker]	banking	systems.”107	
Changing	αc	(Consumer	Alpha)			 By	holding	αb	constant	(αb	=	1)	throughout	all	these	simulations,	we	are	able	to	observe	the	effect	of	increasing	the	differential	between	αb	and	αc	by	simply	increasing	αc.		 Results	were	obtained	using	the	following	scenarios	in	Table	6	below.	Parameters	were	all	kept	constant	under	the	stationarity	conditions	in	order	to	isolate	the	effect	of	changing	αc.		
	 	
																																																								107	Honohan	(2000)	pp32-33.	
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Table	8:	Parameters	for	Changing	αc	
	
Consumer	Alpha	
	
αc	=	1	 αc	=	1.5	 αc	=	1.8	 αc	=	2.3	
Consumer	Shock	Probability	 0.9	 0.9	 0.9	 0.9	
Consumer	Short	Term	Endowment	 100000	 100000	 100000	 100000	
Consumer	Long	Term	Endowment	 17499.987	 17499.987	 17499.987	 17499.987	
Consumer	Gross	Income	 50000	 50000	 50000	 50000	
Consumer	Net	Income	 -82500	 -82500	 -82500	 -82500	
Consumer	Long	Term	Payout	 5.71429	 5.71429	 5.71429	 5.71429	
Consumer	Mean	Rate	of	
Consumption	 0.85	 0.85	 0.85	 0.85	
Consumer	Shock	Multiplier	 2	 2	 2	 2	
Consumer	Population	 100	 100	 100	 100	
Consumer	Group	Size	 10	 10	 10	 10	
All	Consumers	Visible	 FALSE	 FALSE	 FALSE	 FALSE	
Bank	Assets	Visible	 FALSE	 FALSE	 FALSE	 FALSE	
Bank	Long	Term	Asset	Return	 6	 6	 6	 6	
Bank	Short	Term	Asset	Return	 1	 1	 1	 1	
Bank	Count	 1	 1	 1	 1	
Bank	Operating	Cost	 500000	 500000	 500000	 500000	
	 Each	scenario	was	executed	500	times	using	Repast	Simphony	with	Java.	The	results	are	shown	below.108	
Table	9:	Proportion	of	Panics	vs.	αc	
	
Proportion	of	Panics	
Alpha	=		1	 0.397224858	
Alpha	=	1.5	 0.688365764	
Alpha	=	1.8	 0.900157704	
Alpha	=	2.3805	 0.940229312			
Figure	10:	Proportion	of	Panics	vs.	αc																																																									108	An	alternative	set	of	parameters	was	initially	used,	but	it	did	not	yield	the	expected	simulation	results.	This	is	due	to	the	fact	that	the	previous	scenario	did	not	create	much	probability	for	a	panic.	Given	that	the	sample	size	of	500	is	relatively	small,	the	differences	resulting	from	changing	the	magnitude	of	net	income	could	not	be	realized.	A	decision	was	made	after	the	fact	to	use	a	more	volatile	scenario	that	would	clearly	allow	for	significant	differences	even	in	a	small	sample	size.	
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			 		 The	results	clearly	indicate	that	as	αc	increases,	the	proportion	of	panics	also	increases.109	This	result	is	not	surprising	because	αc	is	the	rate	at	which	consumers	can	redeem	their	long	term	assets.	Increasing	αc	directly	increases	the	total	value	of	consumer	assets	held	at	the	bank	to	consumers.	The	actual	value	of	consumer	assets	to	the	bank	is	unaffected	by	αc	since	the	bank	liquidates	long	term	assets	at	αb	which	will	be	left	unchanged	in	these	scenarios.		 Thus	as	αc	increases,	the	amount	consumers	can	withdraw	when	they	panic	increases.	This	means	when	consumers	panic,	they	now	place	add	a	greater	liquidity	demand	to	the	overall	system	with	a	higher	αc	than	they	would	have	with	a	lower	αc.	Interestingly,	this	effect	does	not	occur	until	consumers	start	to	panic	as	αc	is	actually	inconsequential	to	the	liquidity	panic	condition.	Since	one	liquidity	panic	must	occur	before	αc	becomes	relevant	to	the	system,	increasing	αc	does	not																																																									109	It	is	expected	that	the	two	have	a	logarithmic	relationship	which	has	an	asymptotic	limit	of	1	because	the	proportion	of	panics	cannot	exceed	1.	
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increase	the	probability	of	the	first	panic	starting.	However,	due	to	the	increased	panic	withdrawal,	increasing	αc	increases	the	likelihood	of	every	panic	after	the	first.	Increasing	αc	makes	the	panic	transmission	process	stronger.		 The	cost	of	a	consumer	liquidating	his	long	term	assets	is	βc	-	αc.	Thus	as	αc	rises,	the	cost	of	early	liquidation	decreases	so	consumers	are	expected	be	more	willing	to	panic	and	liquidate	early.	This	behavior	is	not	explicitly	included	in	the	PBLM	as	doing	so	would	require	true	risk-aversion	and	optimization.	However,	this	behavior	is	intuitive	and	supported	by	the	literature	so	it	is	to	the	benefit	of	this	study	that	its	results	also	reflect	this	idea.	In	the	DD	model,	expected	returns	in	period	2	are	directly	compared	to	αc.	In	Equation	13	it	is	clear	that	increasing	αc	in	the	DD	leads	to	greater	liquidity	demands	on	the	bank	and	therefore	a	greater	probability	of	a	bank	failure.	As	a	natural	extension	to	the	DD	model,	it	makes	sense	that	this	relationship	should	hold	in	the	PBLM.		 Consistent	with	the	above	analysis	is	the	idea	that	the	probability	of	the	bank	failing	should	increase	as	αc	increases.	The	data	reflected	this	expected	relationship.	These	results	are	given	below.	Note	that	in	the	case	where	αc	=	2.3805,	the	proportion	of	bank	failures	actually	exceeded	the	proportion	of	panics.	This	result	is	not	entirely	surprising	given	that	under	proximity	based	learning,	consumers	may	not	realize	they	are	in	a	bank	failure	situation	based	on	the	information	they	perceive.	
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Table	11:	Proportion	of	Bank	Failures	vs.	αc	
	
Proportion	of	Bank	Failures	
Alpha	=		1	 0.003611673	
Alpha	=	1.5	 0.320541761	
Alpha	=	1.8	 0.825581395	
Alpha	=	2.3805	 0.998005982		
Figure	10:	Proportion	of	Bank	Failures	vs.	αc	
			 The	difference	between	αc	and	αb	is	a	measure	of	the	additional	liquidity	a	bank	provides	to	consumers.	As	the	bank	provides	more	liquidity	(i.e.	a	higher	αc	ceteris	paribus),	the	probability	for	a	bank	failure	increases.	The	simulation	results	support	this	conclusion	both	in	the	perceptions	of	the	consumers	(proportion	of	panics)	and	in	system	response	(proportion	of	bank	failures).	This	relationship	is	discussed	multiple	times	in	the	original	DD	paper	as	something	about	which	banks	and	consumers	should	be	concerned	as	there	is	a	real	loss	when	the	bank	fails.	Other	studies	such	as	Goldstein	and	Pauzner	also	find	a	positive	relationship	between	the	
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differential	of	αc	and	αb	and	the	probability	of	the	bank	failing.	Thus	these	simulation	results	reinforce	this	finding	with	the	added	flavor	of	proximity	based	learning	as	a	panic	transmission	mechanism.		
Changing	Group	Size		 	Group	size	is	the	number	of	neighbors	a	consumer	can	look	at	during	their	proximity	based	learning	phase.	This	section	looks	at	the	impact	of	changing	the	group	size	on	the	system.	Results	were	obtained	using	the	following	scenarios	in	Table	10	below.	All	other	parameters	were	all	kept	constant	under	the	stationarity	conditions	in	order	to	isolate	the	effect	of	changing	group	size.		
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Table	12:	Parameters	for	Changing	Group	Size	
	 Each	scenario	was	executed	500	times	using	Repast	Simphony	with	Java.110		 	
																																																								110	An	alternative	set	of	parameters	was	initially	used,	but	it	did	not	yield	the	expected	simulation	results.	This	is	due	to	the	fact	that	the	previous	scenario	did	not	create	much	probability	for	a	panic.	Given	that	the	sample	size	of	500	is	relatively	small,	the	differences	resulting	from	changing	the	group	size	could	not	be	realized.	A	
	
Consumer	Group	Size	
	
	
Group	Size	2	 Group	Size	5	 Group	Size	10	 Group	Size	25	 Group	Size	100	
Consumer	Shock		
Probability	 0.9	 0.9	 0.9	 0.9	 0.9	
Consumer	Short	
Term		
Endowment	 100000	 100000	 100000	 100000	 100000	
Consumer	Long	Term		
Endowment	 17499.987	 17499.987	 17499.987	 17499.987	 17499.987	
Consumer	Gross	
Income	 50000	 50000	 50000	 50000	 50000	
Consumer	Net	
Income	 -82500	 -82500	 -82500	 -82500	 -82500	
Consumer	Short	
Term	
	Payout	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	
Consumer	Long	Term		
Payout	 5.71429	 5.71429	 5.71429	 5.71429	 5.71429	
Consumer	Mean	Rate	
of	Consumption	 0.85	 0.85	 0.85	 0.85	 0.85	
Consumer	Shock	
Multiplier	 2	 2	 2	 2	 2	
Consumer	Population	 100	 100	 100	 100	 100	
All	Consumers	Visible	 FALSE	 FALSE	 FALSE	 FALSE	 FALSE	
Bank	Assets	Visible	 FALSE	 FALSE	 FALSE	 FALSE	 FALSE	
Bank	Long	Term	
Asset	Return	 6	 6	 6	 6	 6	
Bank	Short	Term	
Asset	Return	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	
Bank	Count	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	
Bank	Operating	Cost	 500000	 500000	 500000	 500000	 500000	
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During	proximity	based	learning,	Consumer	A	looks	at	the	average	liquidity	demands	of	his	neighbors	to	estimate	overall	liquidity	demand	in	the	system.111	As	group	size	increases,	Consumer	A	is	able	to	see	a	larger	proportion	of	the	overall	consumer	population.	Following	the	law	of	large	numbers,	as	group	size	increases,	Consumer	A’s	estimate	of	overall	liquidity	demand	should	be	getting	more	accurate.		 However,	liquidity	demand	in	the	system	is	dynamic	with	respect	to	the	timing	of	the	proximity	based	learning.112	If	Consumer	A	chooses	to	panic,	he	will	withdraw	all	of	his	assets	from	the	bank.	His	panic	and	withdrawal	increase	the	liquidity	demand	in	the	system.	Given	that	liquidity	demand	can	increase	beyond	initial	levels	as	consumers	have	the	opportunity	to	learn,	this	study	chose	to	compare	each	consumer’s	estimate	of	the	current	liquidity	level	at	the	point	in	time	they	learned	to	the	actual	liquidity	level	at	that	same	point	in	time.	Thus	as	group	size	increases,	this	study	looked	at	the	differences	between	consumer	estimates	of	liquidity	demands	and	the	actual	liquidity	demands	at	the	same	points	in	time.113		 The	standard	deviation	of	these	differences	was	used	to	determine	how	accurate	the	consumers’	estimates	were.	A	more	accurate	set	of	estimates	would																																																																																																																																																																						decision	was	made	after	the	fact	to	use	a	more	volatile	scenario	that	would	clearly	allow	for	significant	differences	even	in	a	small	sample	size.	111	Liquidity	demand	is	determined	by	either	the	cash	holdings	of	a	consumer	because	the	consumer	had	such	great	liquidity	demands	he	or	she	needed	to	withdraw	money	from	the	bank	or	the	consumer’s	initial	liquidity	demand	if	the	consumer	had	net	positive	income	and	deposited	money	into	the	bank.	112	Here,	timing	refers	to	the	consumer’s	place	in	line	to	do	proximity	based	learning.	The	first	consumer	to	learn	is	considered	to	proceed	earlier	in	time	than	the	last	consumer	to	learn.	113	For	example,	when	if	Consumer	C	is	the	52nd	person	to	learn,	her	estimate	of	the	liquidity	demand	is	compared	to	the	actual	liquidity	demand	in	the	system	when	she	looks	(i.e.	the	actual	liquidity	demand	after	51	other	consumers	have	already	learned).	
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have	a	lower	standard	deviation	in	the	difference	than	a	less	accurate	set	of	estimates.	In	this	experiment,	a	group	size	of	20	consumers	would	be	expected	to	yield	a	lower	standard	deviation	in	the	estimate	differences	than	a	group	size	of	10	consumers.	The	actual	results	are	below.	
Figure	13:	Standard	Deviation	of	Liquidity	Demand	Estimation	Difference	vs.	
Group	Size	
		
Table	14:	Standard	Deviation	of	Liquidity	Demand	Estimation	Difference	vs.	
Group	Size	
	
Standard	Deviation	of	Liquidity	Demand	Estimation	Difference	
Group	Size	25	 2812179.902	
Group	Size	10	 2896585.175	
Group	Size	5	 3166120.97	
Group	Size	2	 3926264.274	
All	Consumers	Visible	 0	
0	500000	
1000000	1500000	
2000000	2500000	
3000000	3500000	
4000000	4500000	
Group	Size	25	 Group	Size	10	 Group	Size	5	 Group	Size	2	 All	Consumers	Visible	
Standard	Deviation	of	Liquidity	Demand	
Estimation	Difference	
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			 The	results	indicate	that	as	group	size	increases,	the	standard	deviation	between	the	consumers’	estimate	of	the	current	liquidity	demand	and	the	actual	current	liquidity	demand	decreases.	This	was	the	expected	relationship	following	the	idea	that	larger	samples	should	be	more	representative	of	the	overall	system.	This	relationship	plays	out	in	interesting	ways	regarding	the	proportion	of	panic	which	will	be	discussed	later	in	the	section.		 When	all	consumers	were	visible,	during	each	consumer’s	opportunity	to	learn,	the	consumer	could	see	the	liquidity	demands	of	the	entire	system.	Thus	their	“estimate”	actually	matched	the	actual	liquidity	demand	in	the	system.	Thus	the	difference	between	the	estimate	and	actual	was	always	0	so	it	had	a	standard	deviation	of	0.		As	the	group	size	increases,	one	would	expect	to	see	the	standard	deviation	of	the	differences	approach	0.	However,	the	data	shown	do	not	appear	to	indicate	that.	The	reasoning	behind	this	is	the	nature	of	the	learning	process.	The	process	is	coded	so	that	a	consumer	looks	in	her	surrounding	neighborhood	of	a	certain	size	at	the	minimum	of	either	the	group	size	or	the	number	of	consumers	in	her	neighborhood.	For	example,	if	her	group	size	is	25	but	there	are	only	10	consumers	in	her	neighborhood,	she	will	only	observe	the	10	consumers.		To	avoid	this	constraint,	the	author	could	have	expanded	the	consumer’s	neighborhood	to	include	the	entire	simulation	environment.	Unfortunately,	the	software	package	used	in	this	simulation	process	would	be	greatly	slowed	by	that	
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change.	Further,	that	would	take	away	the	idea	of	using	geographical	proximity	as	a	proxy	for	social	familiarity.	This	second	point	is	not	so	important	as	the	resulting	geographical	proximity	is	random	anyway.	For	further	research,	expanding	the	neighborhood	size	to	the	full	simulation	environment	would	be	an	interesting	exercise.	With	that	change,	we	would	almost	surely	see	the	standard	deviation	of	the	difference	approach	0	as	group	size	reached	the	population	total.		 As	group	size	increases,	the	proportion	of	unnecessary	panics	(panics	when	the	bank	is	not	in	an	actual	failure	situation)	was	expected	to	decrease.114	An	unnecessary	panic	occurs	when	a	consumer	misestimates	the	relationship	between	the	bank’s	assets	and	the	overall	liquidity	demand	in	the	system.	The	results	regarding	the	accuracy	of	consumer	liquidity	estimates	suggests	that	consumers	are	less	likely	to	significantly	overestimate	liquidity	demands	as	group	size	increases.	Thus	the	proportion	of	panics	should	decrease	due	to	the	decreased	chance	for	overestimating	liquidity	demands.	However,	the	other	part	of	the	panic	condition	is																																																									114	If	initial	liquidity	demands	are	high	enough	such	that	the	bank	would	fail,	the	bank	is	expected	fail	(in	either	the	current	period	or	the	next)	regardless	of	whether	or	not	any	consumers	panic.	Liquidity	demands	never	go	below	their	initial	level	as	the	learning	process	only	allows	for	consumers	to	withdraw	more	money	from	the	bank	(increasing	liquidity	demands).	The	overall	cost	of	a	bank	failure	is	unaffected	by	the	actions	of	consumers.	However,	which	consumers	pay	the	cost	does	depend	on	consumer	actions.	Consumer	A	may	incorrectly	perceive	the	system	not	to	be	in	a	bank	failure	situation	so	he	will	not	withdraw	his	assets	when	he	learns	and	later	lose	all	of	his	assets	once	the	bank	does	indeed	fail.	Thus	increasing	sample	size	allows	consumers	to	more	accurately	diagnose	bank	failure	situations.	So	with	larger	sample	sizes,	consumers	that	have	the	opportunity	to	withdraw	early	on	(the	first	people	in	line)	are	more	likely	to	avoid	losing	their	assets	in	a	bank	failure	as	opposed	to	consumers	at	the	end	of	the	line	that	may	never	have	the	opportunity	to	withdraw	assets	before	the	bank	fails.	In	summary,	increasing	group	size	in	a	bank	failure	situation	does	not	negatively	affect	the	system	but	it	shifts	the	burden	from	the	early	learning	consumers	to	the	later	consumers	in	line.		
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the	consumer’s	estimate	of	the	bank’s	assets	which	is	unaffected	by	group	size.	This	two	part	nature	of	the	panic	condition	led	to	interesting	results	regarding	the	relationship	between	group	size	and	proportion	of	panic.	The	results	are	given	below.	
Table	15:	Proportion	of	Panic	vs.	Group	Size	
	
Proportion	of	Panics	
Group	Size	25	 0.367087277	
Group	Size	10	 0.397224858	
Group	Size	5	 0.413207298	
Group	Size	2	 0.469592348	
All	Consumers	Visible	 0.646774219		
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Figure	16:	Proportion	of	Panic	vs.	Group	Size	
			 	The	above	results	regarding	group	size	and	proportion	of	panics	appear	to	indicate	that	the	proportion	of	panics	actually	does	decrease	as	group	size	increases.	However,	when	all	consumers	are	visible,	the	proportion	of	panic	actually	rises	quite	significantly.	This	is	due	to	the	problem	mentioned	above	where	the	decision	to	panic	is	based	off	of	both	the	estimated	liquidity	demand	and	the	estimated	bank	assets.	The	idea	that	the	bank	asset	estimation	process	is	vulnerable	to	significant	
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distortions	when	the	consumer	is	shocked	causes	the	panic	proportion	to	spike	when	all	consumers	are	visible.	If	Consumer	A	is	shocked,	he	is	likely	to	panic	regardless	of	the	liquidity	demand	in	the	system	because	of	his	estimate	of	the	bank’s	assets.	If	he	panics,	he	withdraws	what	remaining	assets	he	has	from	the	bank.	This	withdrawal	increases	the	liquidity	demands	on	the	entire	system.	Since	all	consumers	are	visible,	every	other	consumer	sees	that	increased	liquidity	demand.	Thus	consumers	are	constantly	perceiving	the	increased	liquidity	demands	when	consumers	panic.	If	a	significant	proportion	of	consumers	are	getting	shocked,	the	combination	of	the	increasing	liquidity	demands	and	low	estimation	of	bank	assets	provides	the	perfect	conditions	for	large	proportions	of	bank	panics.	In	the	scenario	above,	90%	of	consumers	were	expected	to	be	shocked	each	period	so	the	result	above	is	no	longer	so	surprising.		Further,	bank	failures	actually	occurred	9.1%	of	the	time	when	all	consumers	were	visible	due	to	the	heavy	liquidity	demands	imposed	by	consumers	panicking.	This	was	a	significantly	larger	proportion	than	what	occurred	under	any	of	the	other	group	sizes.	The	bank	failure	proportions	are	shown	below.	Looking	deeper	into	the	actual	level	of	bank	assets	when	consumers	panicked	revealed	that	85.9%	of	the	panics	that	occurred	when	all	consumers	were	visible	were	unnecessary.115	This	is	consistent	with	the	idea	that	although	consumer	estimates	of	the	liquidity	demand	
																																																								115	85.9%	is	actually	a	lower	bound	on	the	proportion	of	the	panics	that	were	unnecessary.	Data	needed	to	calculate	the	exact	proportion	were	not	recorded.	
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were	accurate,	their	inaccurate	estimate	of	the	bank’s	assets	led	to	a	less	optimal	outcome	than	what	occurred	with	smaller	group	sizes.116		
Table	17:	Proportion	of	Bank	Failures	vs.	Group	Size	
	
Proportion	of	Bank	Failure	
Group	Size	2	 0.004491452	
Group	Size	5	 0.004344678	
Group	Size	10	 0.003611673	
Group	Size	25	 0.002594782	
All	Consumers	Visible	 0.091363724	
	 Overall,	the	results	of	this	section	strongly	support	that	consumer	estimates	of	the	liquidity	demand	in	the	system	become	more	accurate	as	group	size	increases.	This	is	beneficial	in	that	consumers	are	less	likely	to	overestimate	liquidity	demands	by	a	significant	amount	which	decreases	the	likelihood	of	panics	in	a	non	failure	situation.	But	more	accurate	liquidity	demand	estimates	alone	are	not	enough	to	guarantee	better	outcomes.	Since	panicking	depends	on	both	liquidity	and	asset	estimations,	depending	on	the	asset	estimation	process,	increasing	the	group	size	could	actually	be	detrimental	as	we	saw	when	all	consumers	were	visible.	Thus	the	overall	benefit	of	increasing	the	information	available	to	consumers	regarding	liquidity	demands	is	unclear	unless	the	bank	asset	estimation	process	is	also	considered.			 	
																																																								116	Less	optimal	refers	to	the	proportion	of	bank	failures	in	Table	15.	
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Bank	Transparency			 Bank	transparency	is	whether	or	not	consumers	are	able	to	directly	see	the	assets	the	bank	holds.		Results	were	obtained	using	the	following	scenarios	in	Table	18	below.	Parameters	were	all	kept	constant	under	the	stationarity	conditions	in	order	to	isolate	the	effect	of	changing	the	bank’s	visibility.		
Table	18:	Parameters	for	Bank	Visibility	
	
Bank	Assets	Visible	 Bank	Assets	Not	Visible	
Consumer	Shock	Probability	 0.5	 0.5	
Consumer	Short	Term	
Endowment	 100000	 100000	
Consumer	Long	Term	
Endowment	 57500	 57500	
Consumer	Gross	Income	 50000	 50000	
Consumer	Net	Income	 -42500	 -42500	
Consumer	Short	Term	Payout	 1.18876	 1.18876	
Consumer	Long	Term	Payout	 1.73913	 1.73913	
Consumer	Mean	Rate	of	
Consumption	 0.85	 0.85	
Consumer	Shock	Multiplier	 2	 2	
Consumer	Population	 100	 100	
All	Consumers	Visible	 FALSE	 FALSE	
Bank	Long	Term	Asset	Return	 1.826087	 1.826087	
Bank	Short	Term	Asset	Return	 1	 1	
Bank	Count	 1	 1	
Bank	Operating	Cost	 500000	 500000	
Consumer	Group	Size	 10	 10			 Each	scenario	was	executed	200	times	using	Repast	Simphony	with	Java.117		
																																																								117	These	scenarios	were	only	executed	200	times	each	due	to	issues	with	the	Repast	Simphony.	
89	
Consumers	base	their	decision	to	panic	on	what	they	expect	the	bank’s	assets	to	be	in	the	next	period	compared	to	expected	liquidity	demands	in	the	next	period.	In	the	general	case,	consumers	are	unable	to	see	the	actual	assets	the	banks	hold.	Consumers	instead	use	ad-hoc	expectations	to	estimate	the	bank’s	assets.	For	example,	Consumer	A	could	look	at	his	levels	of	short	and	long	term	assets	and	estimate	that	every	other	consumer	has	the	same	levels	of	assets	in	the	banks.	In	this	manner,	Consumer	A	can	use	ad-hoc	expectations	to	estimate	the	bank’s	total	levels	of	assets.	However,	the	bank’s	assets	are	dynamic	with	respect	to	the	timing	of	proximity	based	learning	in	the	same	way	liquidity	demands	on	the	system	were	dynamic.118	If	Consumer	A	chooses	to	panic,	he	will	withdraw	all	of	his	assets	from	the	bank.	His	withdrawal	decreases	the	amount	of	assets	the	bank	holds.	Given	that	bank	assets	can	decrease	beyond	initial	levels	after	consumers	have	received	their	net	incomes,	this	study	chose	to	compare	each	consumer’s	estimate	of	the	current	bank	asset	levels	at	the	point	in	time	they	learned	to	the	actual	bank	asset	levels	at	the	same	point	in	time.	The	standard	deviation	of	these	differences	was	used	to	determine	how	accurate	the	consumers’	estimates	were.	A	more	accurate	set	of	estimates	would	have	a	lower	standard	deviation	in	the	difference	than	a	less	accurate	set	of	estimates.	Given	the	way	bank	assets	are	estimated	in	the	PBLM,	there	are	only	two	approaches:	either	the	consumer	used	ad-hoc	expectations	or	the	consumer	could	see	the	bank’s	assets.	The	results	are	below.																																																										118	This	reasoning	is	nearly	identical	to	that	of	the	consumer	estimation	of	liquidity	demand.	
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Table	19:	Standard	Deviation	of	Bank	Assets	Estimation	
	
Standard	Deviation	of	Bank	Assets	Estimation	Difference	
Bank	Assets	Not	Visible	 9280765.07	
Bank	Assets	Visible	 0		
Figure	20:	Standard	Deviation	of	Bank	Assets	Estimation	
	Unsurprisingly,	the	results	indicate	that	when	consumers	need	to	use	ad-hoc	expectations	to	estimate	the	bank’s	current	assets,	those	estimations	are	very	inaccurate.	Much	of	this	inaccuracy	comes	from	the	aforementioned	distortion	when	a	consumer	is	shocked.	When	the	bank’s	assets	are	visible,	during	each	consumer’s	opportunity	to	learn,	the	consumer	could	see	the	actual	bank’s	assets	so	their	“estimate”	was	completely	accurate.	Thus	the	difference	between	the	estimate	and	actual	was	always	0	so	it	had	a	standard	deviation	of	0.		 When	consumers	underestimate	the	bank’s	assets,	they	are	more	likely	to	panic.	This	is	problematic	in	a	non-failure	situation	as	panicking	increases	the	overall	level	of	liquidity	demands	on	the	banks	assets	and	increases	the	likelihood	of	
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others	panicking.119	There	is	also	the	real	cost	of	panicking	and	liquidating	one’s	long	term	assets	early.	Bank	transparency	eliminates	underestimating	bank	assets,	so	we	would	expect	to	see	the	proportion	of	panics	be	smaller	when	there	is	bank	transparency	as	opposed	to	when	there	is	not	transparency.	The	results	showing	the	proportion	of	panics	and	bank	failures	are	below.	
Table	21:	Proportion	of	Panics	and	Bank	Failures	vs.	Bank	Visibility	
	
Proportion	of	Panics	 Proportion	of	Bank	Failures	
Bank	Assets	Not	Visible	 0.288984735	 0	
Bank	Assets	Visible	 0.004627257	 0.000714286		 These	results	indicate	that	consumers	misestimating	(underestimating)	the	bank’s	assets	were	largely	responsible	for	unnecessary	panics.	Although	these	results	came	from	one	scenario	of	parameters	and	a	relatively	small	sample	size,	the	difference	between	the	proportions	of	panics	when	the	bank	assets	were	not	visible	and	when	they	were	visible	show	how	poor	consumers’	ad-hoc	expectations	of	bank	assets	are.	Bank	transparency	has	effect	where	consumers	that	are	shocked	are	no	longer	extremely	likely	to	panic	simply	by	merit	of	being	shocked.	Removing	this	distortion	is	why	the	proportion	of	panics	decreased	so	dramatically	when	bank	assets	became	visible.		 These	results	indicate	that	the	consumer’s	ad-hoc	expectations	for	bank	assets	are	easily	distorted	and	responsible	for	a	large	proportion	of	unnecessary																																																									119	In	bank	failure	situations,	bank	transparency	has	no	overall	effect	as	it	does	not	change	the	magnitude	of	the	loss	due	to	a	bank	failure.	It	merely	affects	the	distribution	of	that	loss	(some	consumers	might	have	incorrectly	not	withdrawn	assets	when	they	had	the	opportunity	to	due	to	overestimating	bank	assets)	but	since	the	bank	is	in	a	failure	situation,	the	overall	cost	is	inevitable.			
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panics.	However,	the	economic	intuition	behind	this	estimation	process	is	still	not	unreasonable,	especially	in	the	face	of	no	clear	alternatives.	Under	the	fair	assumption	that	each	consumer	only	knows	his	or	her	own	level	of	assets	and	that	all	consumers	are	expected	to	have	the	same	level	of	assets,	the	ad-hoc	expectation	process	is	logical	albeit	easily	capable	of	being	distorted.			 Bank	transparency	eliminates	the	consequences	of	overestimating	bank	assets	(there	are	none	in	non-failure	situations)	and	underestimating	assets	(there	are	plenty	in	non-failure	situations).	Thus	in	non-bank	failure	situations,	bank	transparency	decreases	the	probability	of	costly	unnecessary	bank	panics.	The	simulation	results	indicate	this	is	likely	a	very	significant	decrease.	Based	on	these	results,	it	is	clear	that	poor	consumer	estimations	of	bank	assets	are	responsible	for	a	large	proportion	of	unnecessary	panics	in	the	PBLM.	To	rectify	this	issue,	banks	should	consider	making	their	assets	more	visible	to	avoid	consumers	from	underestimating	the	bank’s	assets	and	panicking.120						 	
																																																								120	The	author	reaches	this	conclusion	based	solely	on	the	simulation	results.	It	is	quite	possible	that	banks	may	want	to	avoid	making	their	assets	visible	for	competitive	or	privacy	reasons.	
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Bank	Transparency	and	Consumer	Visibility			 Bank	transparency	is	whether	or	not	consumers	are	able	to	directly	see	the	assets	the	bank	holds.	Complete	consumer	visibility	is	whether	or	not	during	the	learning	phase	consumers	can	see	the	liquidity	demands	of	all	other	consumers.	Results	were	obtained	using	the	following	scenarios.	Parameters	were	all	kept	constant	under	the	stationarity	conditions	in	order	to	isolate	the	effect	of	changing	the	bank’s	visibility.		
Table	22:	Parameters	for	Bank	Transparency	and	Consumer	Visibility	
		 Bank	Assets	Visible	and	All	Consumers	Visible	 Bank	Assets	Not	Visible	and	Group	Size	=	10	
Consumer	Shock	Probability	 0.5	 0.5	
Consumer	Short	Term	Endowment	 100000	 100000	
Consumer	Long	Term	Endowment	 57500	 57500	
Consumer	Gross	Income	 50000	 50000	
Consumer	Net	Income	 -42500	 -42500	
Consumer	Short	Term	Payout	 1.18876	 1.18876	
Consumer	Long	Term	Payout	 1.73913	 1.73913	
Consumer	Mean	Rate	of	
Consumption	 0.85	 0.85	
Consumer	Shock	Multiplier	 2	 2	
Consumer	Population	 100	 100	
Bank	Long	Term	Asset	Return	 1.826087	 1.826087	
Bank	Short	Term	Asset	Return	 1	 1	
Bank	Count	 1	 1	
Bank	Operating	Cost	 500000	 500000	
Consumer	Group	Size	 N/A	 10			 Each	scenario	was	executed	200	times	using	Repast	Simphony	with	Java.121	
																																																								121	These	scenarios	were	only	executed	200	times	each	due	to	issues	with	the	Repast	Simphony.	
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Consumers	are	now	able	to	view	the	bank’s	actual	assets	and	see	the	liquidity	demands	of	all	consumers	when	they	learn	now.	This	scenario	combines	the	previous	conditions	of	bank	transparency	and	complete	consumer	visibility.	Consequently	consumers	no	longer	need	to	use	ad-hoc	expectations	anymore.	The	differences	between	bank	asset	and	liquidity	demand	estimates	are	always	0	now.	For	the	sake	of	comparison,	these	results	will	be	displayed	next	to	results	obtained	using	the	same	parameters	but	without	both	complete	consumer	visibility	and	bank	asset	visibility.	The	results	are	below.	
Figure	23:	Standard	Deviation	of	Estimation	Differences	vs.	Visibility	
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Table	24:	Standard	Deviation	of	Estimation	Differences	vs.	Visibility	
	
Standard	Deviation	of	Liquidity	Demand	
Estimation	Difference	
Standard	Deviation	of	Bank	Assets	
Estimation	Difference	
Bank	and	Consumer	
Visibility	 0	 0	
No	Bank	Visibility	and	
Group	Size	=	10	 1670744	 9278488		 The	results	indicate	that	with	bank	and	consumer	visibility,	consumers	are	much	better	at	“estimating”	as	opposed	to	when	consumers	lack	that	visibility.	With	visibility,	it	is	now	expected	that	no	unnecessary	panics	should	occur.	This	is	the	same	situation	as	the	DD	model	where	either	all	consumers	panic	or	none	of	them	do	because	they	all	act	on	the	same	information.	The	results	regarding	panic	proportion	are	below.	
Figure	25:	Proportion	of	Panic	vs.	Visibility	
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Table	26:	Proportion	of	Panic	vs.	Visibility		
Bank	and	Consumer	Visibility	 0	
No	Bank	Visibility	and	Group	Size	=	10	 0.288456471			 Under	both	scenarios,	no	bank	failures	occurred.	Hence	all	panics	were	unnecessary	panics.	Given	that	unnecessary	panics	do	not	occur	with	visibility,	it	is	unsurprising	that	the	panic	proportion	for	visibility	was	0.	The	panic	proportion	without	visibility	was	0.288.	As	mentioned	throughout	this	paper,	there	is	a	real	cost	associated	with	panics.	Diamond	and	Dybvig	define	it	as	the	cost	of	recalling	loans	and	interrupting	production.122	There	is	also	the	real	penalty	associated	with	liquidating	one’s	assets	early.	Thus	panicking	is	costly	and	should	be	avoided	unless	it	is	necessary.	With	bank	visibility	and	consumer	visibility,	the	proportion	of	unnecessary	panics	was	and	will	be	0.	This	means	all	the	costs	associated	with	unnecessary	panics	are	avoided	with	better	visibility.	In	order	to	reduce	costs	associated	with	unnecessary	bank	failures,	this	study	suggests	the	banking	system	be	as	transparent	as	possible	about	the	bank’s	assets	and	liquidity	demands.		 Increasing	group	size	was	found	to	be	an	effective	way	to	increase	the	accuracy	of	consumer	estimates	regarding	the	liquidity	demands	in	the	system.	Unfortunately	this	study	was	unable	to	explore	any	effective	ways	to	increase	the	accuracy	of	bank	asset	estimates	aside	from	allowing	consumers	to	directly	see	the	bank’s	assets.	Several	alternatives	to	the	ad-hoc	expectation	process	of	bank	assets	are	discussed	in	the	Distortions	subsection	of	the	Proximity	Based	Learning	section.	
																																																								122	DD	p.404	
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Identifying	ways	to	allow	consumers	to	more	accurately	perceive	the	actual	holdings	of	the	bank	without	infringing	on	privacy	or	competitive	concerns	is	key	in	preventing	unnecessary	panics.		 Interestingly,	the	optimal	scenario	of	bank	and	consumer	visibility	is	the	same	scenario	that	this	study	criticizes	for	being	unrealistic.	In	practice,	this	scenario	still	is	impractical.	The	whole	basis	for	proximity	based	learning	is	the	assumption	that	consumers	only	have	access	to	limited	information	on	the	system.	However,	these	results	indicate	that	unnecessary	panics	are	the	result	of	consumers	receiving	information	that	does	not	accurately	reflect	the	state	of	the	system.	Thus	providing	avenues	for	consumers	to	understand	that	the	system	is	not	in	a	failure	situation	is	very	helpful	in	discouraging	false	panics.		 		
Conclusion		
Place	in	Line		The	analysis	of	these	results	supports	that	proximity	based	learning	is	an	effective	form	of	communication.	As	a	consumer’s	place	in	line	increases,	the	likelihood	of	the	consumer	panicking	also	increases.	This	relationship	is	representative	of	panics	leading	to	more	panic	as	expected	in	the	theoretical	model.	
Magnitude	of	Net	Income		 The	analysis	of	these	results	supports	the	mathematical	tipping	point	analysis	where	as	the	magnitude	of	net	income	increases,	the	tipping	point	average	withdrawal	becomes	closer	to	the	expected	average	withdrawal.	As	the	two	
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approach	each	other,	it	becomes	increasingly	likely	that	the	actual	average	withdrawal	could	exceed	the	tipping	point	and	cause	consumers	to	panic	and	the	bank	to	fail.	This	result	was	consistent	with	Honohan’s	(2000)	work	which	found	smaller	economies	with	less	capital	were	at	greater	risk	of	bank	failure	than	developed	economies.	
Changing	αc	The	analysis	supports	that	as	the	liquidity	provided	by	the	bank	increases	(as	αc	increases	relative	to	αb),	the	probability	of	both	panics	and	bank	failures	increase.	This	is	the	expected	theoretical	relationship	found	in	the	DD,	Pauzner	and	Goldstein,	and	Chari	and	Jagannathan.		
Changing	Group	Size		 The	analysis	supports	that	as	group	size	increases,	consumers	see	more	accurate	information	regarding	the	liquidity	demands	on	the	overall	system.	This	is	the	expected	relationship	under	the	law	of	large	numbers.	It	was	interesting	to	note	that	although	this	relationship	holds,	the	proportion	of	panics	does	not	necessarily	decrease,	as	the	panic	condition	is	also	dependent	on	consumer	estimates	of	the	bank’s	assets.	
Bank	Visibility		 The	analysis	supported	that	when	consumers	could	see	the	bank’s	assets,	their	estimates	of	the	bank’s	assets	matched	the	actual	values.	This	result	was	unsurprising.	However,	these	data	revealed	how	the	ad-hoc	expectations	of	the	bank’s	assets	can	be	severely	distorted	when	a	shocked	consumer	uses	his	own	shock-depleted	assets	as	the	expected	per-capita	holdings	of	the	bank.	Several	
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alternatives	to	prevent	this	distortion	should	be	explored	in	future	research	including	using	a	weighted	average	of	a	consumer’s	past	asset	levels	and	allowing	the	consumer	to	view	the	assets	of	other	consumers	so	as	to	increase	the	sample	size.	This	distortion	effect	is	not	clearly	a	problem	intuitively,	but	for	experimental	purposes	alternatives	should	at	least	be	considered.	
Bank	Transparency	and	Consumer	Visibility	
	 The	analysis	supported	that	consumers	were	now	able	to	perfectly	estimate	the	bank’s	assets	and	overall	liquidity	demands	on	the	system.	The	results	actually	indicated	this	was	the	most	optimal	scenario	as	it	completely	eliminated	any	unnecessary	panics.	This	is	also	the	most	unrealistic	scenario	as	privacy	and	competitive	concerns	would	likely	prevent	banks	from	revealing	their	assets	and	prevent	consumers	from	sharing	their	liquidity	needs	with	all	other	consumers,	not	just	the	consumers	they	were	socially	proximal	to.	It	also	removes	any	need	for	proximity	based	learning	as	this	is	the	standard	DD	case.		 	The	data	support	all	the	expected	theoretical	relationships.	Thus	proximity	based	learning	is	a	concept	that	should	be	considered	for	any	future	research	regarding	the	panic	transmission	process	for	any	models	that	build	off	of	the	DD	framework.	In	general,	bank	panics	in	the	PBLM	were	largely	a	result	of	consumers	acting	on	incorrect	limited	information.	The	probability	of	unnecessary	panics	could	be	significantly	decreased	by	making	banks	more	transparent	about	the	assets	they	hold	and	the	liquidity	demands	they	face.	This	is	a	significant	solution	because	if	the	
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probability	of	an	actual	bank	failure	based	on	expected	withdrawals	is	low,	“the	only	thing	we	have	to	fear	is	fear	itself."123,124	The	PBLM	is	not	a	perfect	model.	Stationarity	in	assets	was	important	in	keeping	expected	tipping	points	constant	over	time.	Unfortunately	true	stationarity	could	not	be	achieved	due	to	the	circular	issue	where	a	stationary	system	should	account	for	the	expected	loss	due	to	a	bank	failure,	but	calculating	that	expected	loss	requires	knowing	the	probability	of	bank	panics	and	failures	in	a	stationary	system.	There	was	also	the	issue	of	debt	forgiveness	that	makes	asset	growth	tend	positive.	Thus	all	results	should	be	taken	with	the	caveat	that	stationarity	in	assets	may	or	may	not	exist.	Regardless	of	whether	or	not	stationarity	holds,	it	is	the	firm	belief	of	the	author	that	proximity	based	learning	is	an	effective	method	of	communication	and	a	more	reasonable	assumption	of	what	information	is	available	to	consumers	as	opposed	to	the	perfect	visibility	in	the	DD	model.	The	PBLM	lays	the	foundation	for	future	research	regarding	the	panic	transmission	process.		 	
																																																								123	Franklin	D.	Roosevelt	(1933).		124	Given	that	panics	can	cascade	and	cause	a	strong	system	to	fail.	
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